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In terms of the South African Constitution, every worker has the right to strike. This 
right is regulated in the Labour Relations Act. Workers engaged in essential services 
are prohibited from striking. The prohibition does not apply if a minimum service 
level agreement, guaranteeing services in the event of a strike, has been concluded 
between employers and trade unions. The Essential Services Committee, established 
under the Labour Relations Act ( the Act), must ratify these agreements before they 
become effective.  
 
More than two decades after the LRA was promulgated, very few ratified minimum 
service level agreements have been concluded in the municipal sector. This study 
explores the reasons for this and suggests legislative and policy interventions that 
could be considered on a sector wide basis.  
 
The study is by way of a single-case study of a metropolitan municipality.  Data were 
obtained from two sources: 14 semi-structured interviews with participants and from 
an analysis of documents relevant to the regulation of essential services. 
 
The study established that the legislative framework for regulating essential services 
in South Africa is consistent with the principles and decisions laid down by the 
International Labour Organisation. It however does not provide guidelines for 
determining minimum service levels. An apparent unevenness between the 
representatives of the negotiating counterparts exists in the municipal sector in South 
Africa. Many of the party representatives negotiating minimum service levels, do not 
work in designated essential services or possess relevant technical skills.  
 
The findings of the study suggest steps that could be taken to strengthen the capacity 
of the Essential Services Committee to assist parties in the municipal sector to 
conclude minimum service agreements and build the negotiating capacity of the 
parties. The study also makes recommendations regarding improved participation by 
essential service workers and the broader community in the process. 
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It is widely regarded that the right to strike is an integral part of the right to bargain 
collectively and is a ‘legitimate and indeed essential means available to workers for 
furthering and defending their occupational rights.’1  
 
Convention No. 87 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) deals with 
freedom of association and the protection of the right to organise in the workplace. 
While it does not explicitly refer to a right to strike, the supervisory bodies of the 
ILO2, however, have recognised the convention as incorporating this right.3 These 
supervisory committees of the ILO have however also been quite explicit that the 
right to strike can be curtailed in the case of public servants and workers engaged in 
essential services. 4  
 
The South African Constitution provides that ‘everyone has the right to 
strike’.5 It makes provision that: 
 
Every trade union, employers’ organisation and employer has the right to 
engage in collective bargaining.  National legislation may be enacted to 
regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the legislation may limit a 
right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36 (1)6 
 
 
1 J Servais ‘The ILO law and the freedom to strike’.  Paper presented to University of Toronto 
Symposium, 2009 at 2.  
2 The two supervisory bodies of the ILO, sub-committees of the governing body, are the 
Freedom of Association Committee and the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations. They consider complaints referred to the ILO in respect of 
alleged violations of trade union rights and monitor compliance with conventions and 
recommendations of the ILO. 
3 B Gernigon, A Odero and H Guido 'ILO Principles concerning the right to strike’ (1998) 137 
International Labour Review 4 at 442. 
4 Ibid at 448. 
5 Section 23 (2)(c) of the Constitution. 
6 Section 23(5) of the Constitution. 
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Collective bargaining in South Africa is regulated in the Labour Relations 
Act (LRA)7. Amongst others, the LRA, consistent with established ILO principles, 
prohibits strikes in essential services. Strikes are however permitted in designated 
essential services if a minimum service level has been agreed between employer and 
trade unions or determined by an Essential Services Committee (ESC) established in 
terms of the LRA.  
 
The South African experience however is characterised by an absence of 
minimum service agreements8and a high incidence of often violent and prolonged 
strikes in designated essential services. According to Roskam, unions lay the blame 
for the absence of minimum service agreements at the door of the employer, 
claiming it is a strategy of employers to deny many workers the right to strike by 
refusing to enter into minimum service agreements, thereby weakening the 
bargaining powers of employees.9 On the flipside, many workers engaged in 
essential services have shown a complete disregard for the limitation of their right to 
strike and have simply embarked on unprotected strikes.10 
 
The general response historically has been to call for sterner action to be 
taken against striking public sector workers engaged in essential services. What is 
not considered is whether the existing regulatory framework and its application is in 
part to blame for the strikes in essential services.  
  
The focus of this study is on the absence of minimum service agreements in 
the South African municipal sector. For this purpose, a single-case study approach is 
adopted. The study also examines the way the regulatory framework is understood 
by parties charged with concluding minimum service agreements and the ability of 
the parties to engage constructively in pursuance of minimum service collective 
 
7 Act No. 66 of 1995.  The right to strike is often included in national legislation dealing with 
collective bargaining. See ILO general survey of the reports on the Freedom of association and 
the right to organise convention (no 87) and the right to organise and collective bargaining 
convention (No 98), 1949 (1994) at para 144. 
8 Both the South African Local Government Bargaining Council and the Public Service Co-
ordinating Bargaining Council have concluded framework agreements to guide the conclusion of 
minimum service level agreements at institution level, yet no agreements have been ratified. 
9 A Roskam ‘Draft - Essential and minimum services and the right to strike’ (2009) DPRU, UCT at 5. 
10 Ibid.  
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agreements. The context is dealt with in more detail in chapter 5 of this dissertation 
where the case study is introduced.  
 
The primary research questions in this study are: 
a. Why have employers and trade unions in the municipal sector in South Africa 
failed to conclude minimum service agreements as provided for in the LRA? 
b. To what extent does the current regulatory provisions hinder or promote the 
conclusion of minimum service agreements? 
Secondary questions are: 
a. To what extent do parties prepare for minimum service agreement 
negotiations? 
b. To what extent does compulsory interest arbitration compensate for the 
prohibition of strike rights? 
c. How has the functioning of the ESC changed post the 2014 amendments? 
The study seeks to contribute to the identification by stakeholder parties of the 
strengths and weaknesses within the current regulatory framework and its 
application. This, I submit, will contribute to the development of a balance between 
the constitutional right of workers to embark on strike action and the right of 
communities to receive essential municipal services. To my knowledge, there is no 
other empirical research on the issues covered by this study.  
 
1.2 Dissertation Outline 
 
The dissertation is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the research topic being undertaken. It identifies the research 
problem and highlights how it seeks to contribute to the understanding of essential 
services and minimum service agreements. Brief contextual information is provided 
to ensure an understanding of the setting within which the study takes place. The 
chapter also highlights the significance of the research to practitioners. The primary 
and secondary research questions are set out. The chapter concludes with the 




  Chapter 2 provides a literature and legal analysis on the right to strike in an 
international context; the definition, role and consequences of strikes in essential 
services; and the resolutions and decisions of the ILO’s supervisory bodies on strikes 
in essential services. It also describes the concept of a ‘minimum service’ and how 
the provision of essential services to the broader population is meant to be 
guaranteed without undermining the collective bargaining rights, including the right 
to strike, of workers.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates the development of the right to strike in South Africa 
from a legal perspective. This incorporates the legal provisions in respect of strikes 
in essential services pre-1994, provisions introduced by the 1995 LRA, and the 2014 
amendments to the essential service provisions of the LRA. It also comments on the 
impact of these recent amendments to increasing the number of ratified minimum 
service agreements and minimum services determinations.  This chapter also 
examines the role of the Essential Service Committee pre and post the 2014 
amendments and its functions and powers as provided for in the law and as 
interpreted by the courts. Minimum service agreements, from a South African legal 
and practical perspective, are also discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology and research design employed by this 
study. The use of the case study approach is described and justified, as are the 
qualitative methods used to collect the data. The selection process and final sample 
of interviewees are presented. Analytic techniques used in the data analysis process 
are explained. The ethical considerations of the study have also been included. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the constitutional and legal responsibilities and structure of 
municipalities as providers of services and, as employers. It also introduces the 
metropolitan municipality case study Ximafana (a pseudonym).  The chapter also 
examines collective bargaining arrangements in the municipal sector under the 
jurisdiction of the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) 
and how the parties to the SALGBC have agreed to facilitate and guide the 




Chapter 6 presents the findings and the analysis of the case study. It describes what 
steps employers and trade union parties have undertaken to build the capacity of their 
representatives to negotiate minimum service agreements; how proposals and 
counter-proposals are respectively developed and whether a balance of interests can 
be achieved through the process of negotiated minimum service agreements and/or 
by the imposition of minimum service levels on the parties by the Essential Service 
Committee.  
 
Chapter 7 incorporates concluding remarks. It also details suggested 
recommendations, based on the findings of the Ximafana case study, that could be 
considered to improve the way in which essential services and minimum service 
levels are addressed in the municipal sector. Finally, it sets out the limitations of the 




In the next two chapters, I provide a literature and legal analysis of collective 
bargaining, the right to strike and, the regulatory regimes in respect of essential and 





















This chapter will describe the link between collective bargaining and the right to 
strike in an international context. It will then examine dispute resolution processes 
within essential services by first, explaining how an essential service has been 
defined and how it is intended to balance the collective bargaining rights of workers 
and the rights of the broader society to basic services.  Second, it examines how 
disputes and strikes in essential services are regulated within an international and 
national context. Third, the chapter describes the concept of minimum services as an 
instrument intended to ensure that essential services are provided without 
undermining the collective bargaining rights of workers; their access to appropriate 
dispute resolution mechanisms; and the protection of their right to strike, while, at 
the same time, guaranteeing the rights of the broader population to essential services. 
 
2.2 Collective bargaining and the right to strike 
 
It is widely accepted that the right of workers to strike and their right to bargain 
collectively are inextricably linked. The bargaining power of workers who are 
prohibited from striking is diminished.11  
 
2.2.1 International Principles 
 
Article 3 of Convention 8712 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 13 
provides that ‘[w]orkers…. shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and, 
rules to elect their representatives in full freedom and to organise their administration 
 
11 C Cooper ‘Strikes in essential services’ (1994) 15 ILJ 903 at 903. 
12 The principle ILO instruments from which the right to strike derives are the Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to 
Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). South Africa ratified both these 
conventions on 19 February 1996. 
13 The ILO is a tripartite U.N. agency. Established in 1919 the ILO brings together governments, 
employers and workers of 187-member States to set labour standards, develop policies and 




and activities and to formulate their programmes.’14 Activities and programmes are 
taken to include collective bargaining and a corresponding right to strike.15  
 
Strike action is seen as a legitimate means through which workers are able to 
promote and defend their economic and social interests.16 According to the ILO, 
(t)he right to strike is an intrinsic corollary to the right to organize protected by 
Convention No. 87.’17 According to Jacobs, collective bargaining without the right to 
strike amounts to collective begging.18 
 
The right to collective bargaining and the right to strike are necessary to serve 
as a counterbalancing force to the greater social and economic power of the 
employer.19 The right to strike is an important component of a successful collective 
bargaining system.20 It is more frequently entrenched in constitutions as a 
fundamental right, than the right of employers to lock out workers.21  
 
The ILO considers it permissible for strikes to be restricted or completely 
prohibited in certain circumstances. The ILO’s supervisory committees22 have 
endorsed the limitation of strike action in essential services. Services defined in this 





14 ILO C 87 Freedom of association and the protection of the right to organize convention, 1948. 
South Africa ratified this convention on 19 February 1996. Section 23(4)(e) of the South African 
Constitution has an almost identical clause providing that ‘every trade union and employers’ 
organisation has the right to determine its own administration, programmes and activities.’ 
15 Servais (fn 1) at 3. 
16 ILO Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the 
governing body of the ILO (2006) at para 522. 
17 Ibid at para 523. 
18 A Jacobs ‘ The law of strikes and lock outs ‘ in R Blanpain (Ed) Comparative labour law and 
industrial relations in industrialised market economies 10 ed (2010) 659 at 650. 
19 B Hepple ‘The right to strike in an international context’ 15 Canadian Lab. & Emp. L.J. 133 
(2009) at 140. 
20 NUMSA and others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and another 2003 (2) BCLR 182 (CC) at para 13 
cited in SAPS v POPCRU and another (2011) BLLR 831(CC) at para 19. 
21 Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) 
at para 66 cited in SAPS v POPCRU and another (2011) 9 BLLR 831 (CC) at para 19. 
22 See fn 2 for the explanation of the ILO supervisory bodies. 
23 Gernigon et al (fn 3) at 450. 
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2.2.2 The ILO definition of essential services 
 
The ILO has long held the position that essential services must be interpreted in very 
narrow terms.24 The right to strike would lose all meaning if national legislation 
defined essential services in too broad a manner.25 The ILO Committee of Experts, 
as far back as 1983, defined essential services as ‘services, the interruption of which 
would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or a part of the 
population.’  This definition is often referred to as essential services in the strict 
sense. 26  
 
To determine situations in which a strike could be prohibited, the criterion 
that must be established is the existence of a clear and imminent threat to the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. Also, what is meant 
by essential services in the strict sense of the term depends to a large extent on the 
circumstances prevailing in a country.27 
 
No conclusive list on what constitutes essential and non-essential services has 
been agreed on at the ILO. From the cases that have come before the supervisory 
bodies of the ILO28, certain services have been found to be essential and others non-
essential. Amongst the services deemed to be essential are hospital services; 
electricity services; water supply services; the telephone service; police and the 
armed forces; fire-fighting services; public and private prison services; and, the 
provision of food to pupils of school age.29 
 
According to Gernigon et al, the concept of an essential service, as provided 
for in law, assumes different applications dependent on the circumstances in each 
country. In some instances, essential services are referred to in situations where 
strikes are not prohibited but a minimum service is required. In other cases, the 
 
24 R le Roux and T Cohen ‘Understanding the limitations to the right to strike in essential and 
public services in the SADC Region’ Per/PELJ 2016(19) 4. 
25 ILO (fn 22)) at para 159. See also Servais (fn 1) at 5. 
26 B Gernigon et al (fn 3) at 450. 
27 ILO (fn 22) at para 581 -582. See also the ILO ‘General Survey of the Reports on the Freedom 
of Association and the Right to Organize Convention (No 87) 1948 and the Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining Convention (No 98) 1949 (1994)’ at para 159 - 160. 
28 See fn 2 for a description of the supervisory bodies of the ILO. 
29 ILO ((fn 22) at para 585. 
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concept of essential services is applied more restrictively including the prohibition of 
strikes.30  
 
Services held to be non-essential and which are in some way related to the 
municipal sector are construction; metropolitan transport; refuse collection; and 
computer services for the collection of excise duties and taxes. This list is not 
exhaustive31 
 
Four key principles32 can be extracted from the principles established by the 
ILO in respect of the right to strike insofar as these relate to essential services. First, 
a minimum service may be imposed in instances where it is necessary to ensure the 
safety of persons. Second, while the use of replacement labour impinges on workers’ 
right to strike, this is acceptable where an essential service is involved. Third, 
minimum services may be established in public utility services, the determination of 
which should be decided by trade unions and the relevant authority. Fourth, a back to 
work order is admissible in the event of a strike in an essential service.  
 
Ackerman states that the use of the armed forces or other persons to deliver 
services that have been suspended as a result of strike action and to place these 
workers onto the premises of the service delivery authority is also admissible.33 
 
Strikes in essential services are restricted in many countries where workers 
otherwise enjoy the right to strike. The restrictions can take the form of an outright 
ban in the case of workers providing essential services in the strict sense. The 
restrictions can also require much longer strike notice periods, including what is 
termed a ‘cooling off’ period, before strike action can be embarked on.34 
 
 
30 See Gernigon et al (fn 3) at 450 – 452 for a fuller exposition of how this principle has been 
applied. See also Roskam (fn 9) 26 – 54 for a comparative study of Canada, Italy, Brazil, 
Denmark, India and Chile. 
31 ILO (fn 22) at para 587. 
32 Ibid at 476 and 477. The authors list a total of 13 principles on the application of the right to 
strike, that can be extracted from the decisions of the ILO supervisory committees. 
33 M Ackerman ‘The right to strike in essential services in MERCOSUR countries’ International 
Labour Review (1994) 133 International Labour Review 389. 
34 ILO (fn 22) at para 553 and 554. 
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If the right to strike is subject to restrictions or a prohibition, workers who are 
denied the right to strike in defence of their socio-economic interests should have 
access to compensatory measures. This could include expeditious conciliation and 
mediation procedures leading, in the event of deadlock, to compulsory arbitration. It 
is imperative that workers can participate in determining and implementing an 
impartial arbitration procedure, the outcome of which is binding on all parties and 
implemented speedily and in total.35 
 
2.2.3 The concept of a minimum service 
 
 
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has determined that a 
minimum service may be introduced or imposed in a service that has been 
determined to be an essential service in the strict sense; services that are not 
necessarily essential in the strict sense but where an interruption of the service could 
result in an ‘acute national crisis endangering the normal living conditions of the 
population’; and, the public provision of ‘fundamental services’.36 The Committee 
went no further in identifying what constitutes an adequate level of minimum 
services. 
 
The CFA was however very explicit regarding the means by which a 
minimum service should be determined. It specifically held that: 
 
‘The determination of minimum services and the minimum number of 
workers providing them should involve not only the public authorities, but 
also the relevant employers’ and workers’ organizations. This not only allows 
a careful exchange of viewpoints on what in a given situation can be 
considered to be the minimum services that are strictly necessary, but also 
contributes to guaranteeing that the scope of the minimum service does not 
result in the strike becoming ineffective in practice because of its limited 
impact, and to dissipating possible impressions in the trade union 
organizations that a strike has come to nothing because of over-generous and 
unilaterally fixed minimum services.’37 
 
Negotiations to determine the applicable minimum service should, according 
to the CFA, ideally not take place during a labour dispute. This, the committee held, 
 
35 ILO (fn 33) at para 164. See also Gernigon et al (fn 3) at 450. 
36 ILO (fn 22) at 606 and 607. 
37 Ibid at 612. 
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will contribute to the parties conducting the negotiations in an objective and detached 
way.38 The CFA is equally clear that if parties are unable to reach an agreement on 
what constitutes a specific minimum service, legislation should make provision for 
any dispute to be settled by an independent body.39 
 
2.4 Dispute Resolution 
 
2.4.1 Compulsory Interest Arbitration 
 
Compulsory interest arbitration to end a dispute has been found to be acceptable by 
the CFA, if strikes are prohibited in essential services in the strict sense.40 
Workers who are denied the right to strike should be provided with ‘adequate, 
impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration proceedings in which the parties 
concerned can take part at every stage and in which the awards, once made, are fully 
and promptly implemented.’41 The CFA has decided that the legislative power to 
approve public spending should not negatively impact on or undermine compliance 
with the terms of any interest arbitration award.42 Put differently, no authority 
responsible in law for approving government spending should, in any way, block 
compliance with the terms of an interest arbitration award on financial grounds. 
If not prescribed in the above terms or if parties do not voluntarily agree to it, then 
such actions have been held to be contrary to the right of trade unions to freely 
organise their activities.43 
 
Feuille, cited in Rose, states that there are five criteria for testing the 
effectiveness of compulsory arbitration in respect of essential services.44 These are: 
• whether the process protects public interest by preventing strikes;  
• whether it protects worker interests by providing speedy dispute resolution with 
outcomes that are similar to other settlements;  
 
38 Ibid at 561. 
39 Ibid at 614. 
40 Ibid at 564. 
41 Ibid at 596. 
42 Servais (fn 1) at 9. 
43 ILO (fn 22) at 565. 
44 Joseph Rose ‘Regulating and Resolving Public Sector Disputes in Canada’ Journal of Industrial 
Relations v.50, no.4, Sept 2008 at 549-559. 
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• whether it balances the contesting interests by encouraging compliance with awards 
thereby avoiding further strive and conflict;  
• whether it prevents direct interference by government in the dispute; and 
• whether it inhibits genuine collective bargaining.  
According to Rose, a ‘considerable amount of criticism’ of compulsory arbitration 
from both employer and employee parties is present in Canada.45 Findings from 
studies that spanned different levels and institutions in the Canadian public sector 
reveal that compulsory arbitration is ‘associated with low settlement rates’ and 
‘higher settlement costs.’46  
 
Given the findings of these studies, Rose questions why there is not greater 
acceptance of extending the right to strike to all public sector workers. Rose argues, 
that this will not lead to a greater number of strikes. Studies confirm that the number 





In this chapter, I examined the relationship between collective bargaining and the 
right to strike within the context of essential services at an international level. The 
Canadian experience, as articulated by Rose, suggests to me that the principles 
established by the ILO, specifically those relating to compulsory interest arbitration, 
are not without their problems. The next chapter examines collective bargaining and 
the right to strike in South Africa. It also examines dispute resolution and the 







45 Ibid at 550. 
46 Ibid at 552. 










This chapter will examine the right to strike in essential services in South Africa as 
regulated by law inclusive of the amendments to the LRA promulgated in 2014; the 
power and functions of the Essential Services Committee (ESC); the concept of 
minimum services as applied in South Africa; and, the extent to which minimum 
service agreements have been concluded. 
 
3.2 Collective bargaining and right to strike in South Africa 
 
The drafters48 of the 1995 LRA49, on the back of the increase in strike action, were of 
the view that South African labour law, at the time, had failed badly in its objective 
to prevent and resolve disputes, thereby reducing the number of strikes. This view 
was shared by trade unions and employers who considered many of the strikes 
unnecessary. These parties claimed that the reasons for this situation were both 
institutional and legal.50 The introduction of an independent dispute resolution body, 
the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), was aimed at 
enhancing dispute resolution in both the private and public sectors. 
 
The drafters of the LRA were also explicit in declaring that ‘the regulation of 
the right to strike by the LRA…. does not pass constitutional muster.’51 To address 
this, the 1995 LRA made provision for a simplified procedure for a protected strike 
 
48 The government established a Ministerial Legal Task Team to review South Africa’s labour 
legislation in order to, amongst others, ensure that legislation gave effect to South Africa’s 
commitments as a member of the ILO and that it complied with the provisions of the South 
African Constitution. To this end, it drafted what was to become the 1995 LRA. 
49 Act 66 of 1995 
50 ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ (1995) 16 ILJ 278 at 300. 
51 Ibid  
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or lock-out.52 If an issue in dispute has been referred to a bargaining council or the 
CCMA for conciliation and, a certificate stating that the issue in dispute has not been 
resolved or a period of 30 days has elapsed since the issue in dispute had been 
referred, a party may choose to go on strike or, in the case of an employer, apply a 
lock-out. Forty-eight hours written notice of a strike or lock-out must be given. The 
notice period applicable in situations where the State is the employer is 7 days. 
 
The failure of labour legislation, at the time, to meet its objective of 
preventing strikes in essential services was another problem identified by the 
drafters. 53 Section 46(1), read with section 65 of the 1956 LRA, had stipulated that 
local authorities and their employees, and employers other than a local authority 
providing ‘light, power, water, sanitation, passenger transportation or fire 
extinguishing services’ were prohibited from striking.54 The 1995 LRA, at section 
65, stipulates that participation by persons engaged in an essential service in a strike 
or a lock-out is prohibited.  
 
Pre-1995 legislation also did not allow for forms of self-regulation but did 
allow government to declare certain industries essential eg the perishable food 
industry, certain sections of the food and canning industry and, employers and 
employees engaged in the supply or distribution of petrol or other fuels used by local 
authorities.55 According to Pillay, this prohibition included services that did not fit 
into the ILO definition of essential services in the strict sense.56 Legislation, at the 
time, also allowed for criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, for any 
transgression of the law.57 
 
Even before the adoption of the Constitution and the promulgation of the 
1995 LRA, South African courts had occasion to consider the nature of the 
relationship between the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike. This was 
 
52 Section 64 of Act 66 of 1995. 
53 Explanatory Memorandum (fn 54) at 301. 
54 Labour Relations Act No 8 of 1956 at section 46 read with section 65. 
55 Ibid at section 46(7). 
56 D Pillay ‘Essential services under the new LRA’ (2001) 22 ILJ 1 at 1. 
57 T Cohen and R Le Roux ‘Limitations of the right to strike in the public sector and essential 
services’ in B Hepple et al (eds) Laws against strikes – The South African Experience in an 
international and comparative perspective (2016) at 113. 
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in matters that came before the old Industrial Court under the erstwhile unfair labour 
practice provisions of the 1956 Labour Relations Act.58 
 
The 1995 LRA however provides very significant protection to the right to 
strike. This right flows from section 23 of the Constitution that provides that every 
worker has the right to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union.  
It goes further to provide that ‘[e]very trade union, employers’ organisation and 
employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining’ and that ‘[n]ational 
legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining.’ These constitutional 
rights are given legislative effect in the LRA. 
 
In NUMSA v Bader Bop59, the Constitutional Court (CC) held that the right to 
strike ‘is of importance for the dignity of workers who in our constitutional order 
may not be treated as coerced employees’ and that ‘it is through industrial action that 
workers are able to assert bargaining power in industrial relations.’ 
 
The CC, in an ex parte certification judgment on whether the proposed 
Constitution complied with the principles enshrined in the Interim Constitution, 
dismissed an employer submission that an employer’s right to lock-out workers is 
equivalent to the right of workers to strike. Collective bargaining, the CC held, is 
premised on the unequal nature of the relationship between an employer and an 
individual employee and that strike action is part of a worker’s armoury.60 
 
The right to strike afforded by the Constitution is however a qualified right. 
The Constitution allows for national legislation to be enacted to regulate collective 
bargaining.  To the extent that legislation may limit the right to strike, the limitation 
must comply with the provisions section 36 (1) of the Constitution.61 
 
58  See National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd  (1991) 12 ILJ 1221 
(A) and Food & Allied Workers Union v Spekenham Supreme (2)  (1988) 9 ILJ 628 (IC). 
59 National Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and Another 
(2003)24 ILJ 305 (CC) at para 13. 
60 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa (1996) 17 ILJ 821 (CC). See para 66. 
61 Section 36 provides that: 
Limitation of rights. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 




Collective bargaining is regulated by the LRA.62 Key purposes of the LRA 
are to give effect to the ‘obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of 
the ILO’63 and, to ‘promote orderly collective bargaining ‘[and] the effective 
resolution of labour disputes.’64 It has been determined by the ILO that once a right 
to collective bargaining is recognised, implicit within it will be the right to exercise 
some economic power against other parties in collective bargaining.65 The LRA goes 
beyond this and specifically recognises the right to strike.66  
 
Granting this right to strike, in contrast to the more limited ‘recourse’ to lock-
out, that it bestows on employers, illustrates a further means by which the LRA 
attempts to bring about a shift in the balance of power between employers and 
employees.67 The LRA framework for regulating strikes does however, amongst 
other procedural and substantive regulations, prohibit strike action (and lock-outs) in 
services that have been designated as essential services.68 This limitation to the right 
to strike has not been challenged and I would argue that, when considered against the 
ILO pronunciations on strikes in essential services, seems unlikely to muster the 
support of the South African courts.  
 
3.3 The framework for regulating strikes in essential services 
 
3.3.1 The regulation of essential services in South Africa 
 
 
all relevant factors, including- 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 
law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
62 The LRA does exclude two groups of workers from its application and by extension, the right 
to strike. These are members of the South African National Defence Force and the State Security 
Agency. 
63 Section 1 of the LRA. 
64 Ibid.  
65 K Selala ‘The right to strike and the future of collective bargaining in South Africa: An 
exploratory analysis’ (2014) 3 International Journal of Social Sciences 5 at 116. 
66 Section 64(1), LRA. 
67 D du Toit et al Labour Relations Law – A Comprehensive Guide 6 ed (2015) at 333. 
68 Section 65(d)(i) of the LRA. 
26 
 
The 1995 LRA provides a framework for the self-regulation of essential services in 
the strict sense.69 This is consistent with the ‘regulated flexibility’ paradigm that 
informed the review of South African labour laws in the 1990s.70 The essential 
services framework rests on five basic premises. These are: 
• that strikes in essential services are prohibited; 
• interest disputes in essential services are subject to compulsory arbitration;  
• essential services are defined in accordance with the ILO’s definition of essential 
services in the strict sense;  
• except for the Parliamentary Service and the South African Police Service, the 
LRA does not follow a list approach; and  
• parties are given an opportunity to narrow the designated essential service by 
way of negotiating a minimum service agreement. The minimum service is then 
regarded as the essential service in respect of the employer and its employees. 71 
 
The legal framework in South Africa is similar to the regulatory framework in 
Italy although there was no explicit borrowing by the South African drafting team. 
The regulatory system in Italy, where the right to strike is also provided for in the 
constitution and regulated by legislation, is built on the recognition of the 
constitutionally protected rights of workers to strike and the rights of people to life, 
health, freedom, security, mobility and communication. According to Bordogna, 
public services are deemed essential to the extent that they deliver these services.72  
 
Regulation in Italy places emphasis on the social partners recognising their 
responsibility to negotiate minimum service agreements to ensure that the protected 
rights of the broader population are balanced with the workers’ right to strike.73 So, 
while Italy’s regulatory framework is based on the notion of ‘essential public 
 
69 Sections 70 – 74 of the LRA. 
70  See H Cheadle ‘Regulated flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’ (2006) 27 ILJ 663. 
See also D du Toit and R Ronnie ‘Regulating the informal economy’ (2014) 35 ILJ 1802 at 1812 
for a critique of the ‘regulated flexibility’ model under current circumstances. 
71 Section 72(3)(a) of the LRA. See also Cohen and le Roux (fn 62) at 114.   
72 L Bordogna ‘Disputes regulation in essential public services in Italy: Strengths and 
weaknesses of a ‘pluralist approach.’  (2008) 50 Journal of Industrial Relations 4 at 597. 
73 Ibid at 608. 
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services’, and South Africa’s on ‘essential services in the strict sense’, they both 
reflect a desire for self-regulation by means of consensus and tripartism.74  
 
As I have already alluded, the concept of a self-regulation has not been without 
its problems in South Africa. This is best reflected in the absence of minimum 
service agreements. To address this situation, amendments were introduced to the 
LRA in 2014.  
 
3.3.2 The definition of a minimum service 
 
The LRA permits the ESC to ratify collective agreements allowing for minimum 
services in services that have already been designated as an essential service.75  
 
A minimum service is not defined in the LRA. Roskam says that ‘it is evident 
that what section 72 of the LRA has in mind is a minimum service of a designated 
essential service’. This entails the shrinking of the designated essential service so 
that workers, who were denied the right to strike in the essential service, now fall 
outside the agreed minimum service and regain their right to strike. The minimum 
service then becomes the essential service in respect of the parties to the ratified 
minimum service collective agreement.76  
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74 Cohen and Le Roux (fn 57) at 133 and134. 
75 Section 72(3) of the LRA. 
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According to Pillay, minimum services are essential services reduced temporarily 
under certain conditions to enable and, I would argue, restrict industrial action.77  A 
minimum service is one that is sufficient to ensure that during strikes, ‘no person’s 
life, personal safety of health is endangered’.78 Once identified, these services have 
to be included in an MSA and any service that does not fit within this definition must 
be excluded. If non-essential services are included, the MSA stands to be reviewed 
on the grounds that they constitute an unjustifiable limitation of the right to strike.79 
 
In the event of strike action, minimum services should only be permitted 
where services, if interrupted, endanger the life, personal safety or health of the 
whole or part of the population. Minimum services are also permitted in services that 
are not essential in the strict sense but where the extent and the duration of the strike 
could render the service essential.80As stated above, minimum service agreements 
are only permissible in services that have already been designated as essential. They 
must be ratified by the ESC before they become effective. This is primarily to allow 
the ESC to determine whether basic needs of the public would be met in the event of 
an interruption to the service.81 
 
3.3.3 The composition and functions of the Essential Services Committee (ESC) 
 
The 1995 LRA, at section 70, makes provision for the establishment of an Essential 
Services Committee (ESC). The Minister of Labour must, after consulting the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) establish an ESC 
and appoint persons that she considers fit to serve on the ESC.82 This committee is 
charged with identifying and declaring essential services.83 The parties to the 
 
77 D Pillay ‘Essential Services: Developing tools for minimum service agreements’ (2012) 33 ILJ 
at 807. This understanding was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Eskom Holdings v 
NUM and others (2011) 32 ILJ 2904 (SCA) at para 29. 
78 Ibid at 811. 
79 Ibid. 
80 ILO (fn 22) at 606. 
81 Pillay (fn 56) at 22. 
82 Section 70 and 70A of the LRA. NEDLAC is the primary tripartite institution in South Africa 
established in terms of National Economic, Development and Labour Council Act. 35 of 1994. 
83 The ESC also has the power to designate what is termed a ‘maintenance service’. A 
maintenance service is defined in section 75(1) of the LRA to mean any ‘a service, the 




NEDLAC must each nominate two persons who the Minister must appoint to the 
ESC if the Minister deems them to be fit for appointment.  
 
The ESC must also conduct investigations as to whether the whole or part of 
a service is an essential service; determine disputes about whether a whole or part of 
a service is essential and/or whether an employee is engaged in a service that has 
been declared essential; and vary or cancel the designation for the whole or part of a 
service as an essential service. Importantly, the ESC must ratify any collective 
agreement that provides for the maintenance of a minimum service in services that 
have already been designated as an essential service.84 
 
Amongst the 2014 amendments to the LRA, that sought to improve the 
efficacy and functionality of the ESC, was one permitting the ESC to establish panels 
that undertake certain of the functions allocated to the ESC.85 
 
This amendment, it is suggested, is meant to speed up the process of either 
concluding minimum service agreements or the handing down of determinations by 
the ESC. It stipulates that: 
 
(1)  When making a determination in terms of section 71, a panel of the 
essential services committee may issue an order—  ( a) directing the parties 
to negotiate a minimum services agreement as contemplated in this section 
within a period specified in the order;  ( b) if an agreement is not negotiated 
within the specified period, permitting either party to refer the matter to 
conciliation at the Commission or a bargaining council having jurisdiction.  
(2)  If the parties fail to conclude a collective agreement providing for the 
maintenance of minimum services or if a collective agreement is not ratified, 
a panel appointed by the essential services committee may determine the 
minimum services that are required to be maintained in an essential service.86  
 
As I reflect in the next section, the impact and effect of these amendments have not 




84 Section 70D of the LRA. 
85 Section 70C of the LRA. 
86 Sections 71(1) and 71(2). 
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3.4 Designating an essential service in South Africa 
 
3.4.1 Approach to be adopted in designating an essential service 
 
There are two main approaches generally used to identify essential services. Firstly, 
by way of identifying employers who are accepted to be providing essential services 
and secondly, by the potential consequence of an interruption in the service. The 
latter approach is followed in South Africa with two exceptions. The Parliamentary 
Service and the South African Police Service (SAPS) are explicitly declared to be 
essential services.87 The CC, in SAPS v POPCRU,88 held that only members of the 
SAPS employed in terms of the South African Police Service Act89, were essential 
and not support staff employed by SAPS in terms of the Public Service Act.90The 
inclusion of the Parliamentary Service however remains questionable when 
considered against the definition of an essential service.91 
 
According to Pillay, the definition of an essential service guides the approach to 
deciding whether a service is essential. Firstly, the essential nature of the service is 
determined by the consequence of the service being interrupted, be that partial or 
complete.  In the event of strike action, a service that can continue in an 
uninterrupted manner by other means, eg readily available alternative labour or 
through mechanisation cannot be designated as an essential service.92  
 
The costs associated with bringing in alternative labour cannot be a 
consideration for declaring a service essential.  A cost benefit analysis of 
replacement labour, however, illustrates the implications for both parties of this 
approach. From an employer perspective, the costs for appointing replacement labour 
might very well compel them to settle the dispute. Alternatively, the employers may 
find the use of the replacement labour more cost-effective resulting in them 
considering dismissals on the grounds of operational requirements.93  
 
87 Du Toit et al (fn 67) at 372 and 373 
88 (2011) 9 BLLR 831 (CC) 
89 Act No. 68 of 1995. 
90 Proclamation 103 of 1994 
91 Du Toit et al (fn 67) at 373 





The criteria for arriving at the determination of an essential service, is the 
existence of ‘a clear and imminent threat to the life, personal safety or health of the 
whole or part of the population.94 Drawing from the meaning of ‘endanger’, ie ‘put at 
risk, imperil’ or ‘jeopardise’, and the fact that the word is used in the present tense, 
Pillay asserts that it is the conditions or circumstances prevailing ‘at the time the 
designation or determination is made [that] must be considered and not 
circumstances that may obtain at some stage in the future.’95 She goes further to say 
that, ‘the operative word therefore is whether an interruption ‘would’, not ‘could’ or 
‘might’ endanger life, personal, safety and health.’96 According to Pillay, ‘[e]ndanger 
also reinforces the strict interpretation to exclude inconvenience and hardship. Life, 
health and personal safety exclude endangerment to the business or economy. 
Further, ‘[t]he population refers to people, not the plant or animal population.’97 
 
The obligations of the state to provide certain basic services that impact on 
the life, personal safety and health of all or a part of the population must be 
considered by the ESC when making a determination.98 
 
Many other factors must be considered in determining whether a service can 
be deemed to be essential. While the nature of the service is important, consideration 
must also be had for, amongst others, available technology, the needs of the 
population, the availability of the service, the cost of providing the service, the 
service providers, and the location in which the service is delivered. These factors all 
go towards determining what impact the interruption of a service would have. Any 
determination about whether a service is essential would therefore have to be based 
on the collection of data and a finding on fact.99 These factors are fluid. As the 
circumstances within which services are provided change, so the essential or 
‘inessential’ nature of services change.100 
 
 
94 Servais (fn 1) at 4. 
95 Pillay (fn 56) at 11. 
96  Pillay (fn 77) at 807. 
97 Ibid at 809. 
98 Pillay (fn 56) at 9. 
99 Pillay (fn 77) at 810. 
100 Ibid at 810.  
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3.4.2 The first essential service determinations 
 
The first ESC, appointed in 1996, designated, after convening public hearings, 
several services as essential services. These were all published in the Government 
Gazette during 1997 and 1998.101Designated essential services specifically related to 
the municipal sector were: 
• municipal traffic services and policing; 
• municipal health; 
• municipal security; 
• the supply and distribution of water; 
• the generation; transmission and distribution of power; 
• firefighting; and 
• the following parts of sanitation services: 
o the maintenance and operation of water-borne sewerage systems, including 
pumping stations and the control of discharge of industrial effluent into the 
system; 
o the maintenance and operation of sewerage purification works; 
o the collection of refuse of an organic nature; 
o the collection of infectious refuse from medical and veterinary hospitals or 
practices; 
o the collection and disposal of refuse at a disposal site; and 
o the collection of refuse left uncollected for 14(fourteen) days or longer, 
including domestic refuse and refuse on public roads and open spaces. 
As is evident from the contents of the gazettes, the initial determinations by 
the ESC did not follow the narrow definition of an essential service as set out in the 
LRA. The ESC ‘instead, tended to identify sectors or sub-sectors within which 
essential services are performed rather than the essential services themselves’. This 
‘was not accidental’ but was intended to allow employers and trade unions the 
opportunity of narrowing or fine-tuning these designations by way of concluding 
minimum service level agreements.102 
 
 
101 See GN 784 of 6 June 1997, GN 1216 of 12 September 1997, GN 1542 of 21 November 1997 
and GN 436 of 27 March 1998. 
102 Du Toit et al Chapter 13: South Africa in M Mironi and M Schlachter (eds) in Regulating 
strikes in essential services: A comparative ‘law in action’ perspective (2019) at 390 
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It has been the failure of the parties to conclude minimum service level 
agreements, as anticipated by the LRA and prompted by the ESC by way of its initial 
determinations, that has remained a major stumbling block to the promotion of 
orderly collective bargaining and the balancing of contesting rights in certain sectors. 
 
3.4.3 Essential and Minimum Services: Compulsory interest arbitration 
 
In terms of the LRA, any party that is prohibited from engaging in a strike or lock-
out because they are in a designated essential service, may refer a dispute to the 
CCMA or a bargaining council having jurisdiction for conciliation and, if the dispute 
remains unresolved, for compulsory arbitration.103 The LRA also provides at section 
139 (1) that: 
 
If a dispute about a matter of mutual interest proceeds to arbitration and any 
party is engaged in an essential service…within 30 days of the date of the 
certificate referred to in section 136(1)(a), or within a further period agreed to 
between the parties to the dispute, the commissioner must complete the 
arbitration and issue an arbitration award with brief reasons signed by the 
commissioner. 
This provision is aimed at providing parties in essential services with a speedy 
dispute resolution process. 
 
The LRA provisions are generally in line with long-established ILO 
principles and decisions on disputes in essential services. The access to an expedited 
and impartial conciliation and arbitration process is key amongst these decisions and 
principles. The one exception being section 74(5) of the 1995 LRA. This section 
stipulates that an award against the State that has financial implications only 
becomes binding 14 days after the award has been issued. The Minister of Labour is, 
however, entitled to table this award before Parliament within this period. This has 
the effect of suspending the binding nature of the award for a further 14 days. 
Parliament, when it considers the matter, has the power to declare the award to be 
non-binding. The dispute would then have to be referred again to the parties for 
 
103 Section 74(1) – (4) of the LRA. 
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conciliation and, if necessary, arbitration. The LRA is however silent on whether the 
second award would be subject to the same restrictions. The courts have yet to 
clarify this issue.104  
 
Some indication of how the courts would approach this issue can be gleaned 
from an earlier Labour Appeal Court (LAC) judgment. The LAC, in 2012,105 upheld 
an arbitration award in which the arbitrator had held that an award in the public 
sector requiring the application of unbudgeted funds would have to be presented to 
Parliament. The authority and jurisdiction of Parliament to approve unbudgeted 
funds in order to comply with an award would, however, not be undermined if an 
arbitrator made such an award. The arbitrator had relied on section 74 for arriving at 
his finding. He stated that he had the authority to make the award and Parliament had 
the authority to reverse that award. This approach, it is posited, would run contrary to 
the ILO principle that the legislative intervention should not affect on compliance 
with the terms of any compulsory arbitration award.106 Based on this judgment, it 
does appear that any second award would be subjected to the same process. This, I 
suggest, is at odds with the approach adopted by the CC in NUMSA v Bader Bop 
107on the relationship between freedom of association, the right to strike, and orderly 
collective bargaining. 
 
Notwithstanding the high number of strikes in the South African public 
sector, compulsory arbitration does not appear to be a favoured dispute resolution 
mechanism. This may be due to the complexity of conducting an interest arbitration.  
The only major interest arbitration conducted in South Africa occurred in the public 
service in 1999, dragged on for 7 months, and ended inconclusively.108 There is 
however a further complicating factor that aggravated against more disputes being 
referred to compulsory arbitration. I deal with this issue next. 
 
 
104 Du Toit et al (fn 102) at 394. 
105 Public Servants Association obo members v National Prosecuting Authority and Another 
(2012) 8 BBLR 765 (LAC). 
106 Servais (fn 1) at 9. 
107 NUMSA v Bader Bop (fn 30)  
108 Du Toit et al (fn 102) at 394.  See PSA and others and the Government of the RSA (case no. 
PSBC 1 1999-2000). 
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3.4.4 The interpretation and application of sections 72(3) of the LRA 
 
If parties reach an agreement regarding minimum service levels that is 
ratified by the ESC, the minimum service then becomes the essential service in 
respect of the employer and employees covered by the agreement.  The workers 
delivering the minimum service are then prohibited from striking.109 All other 
workers within the initial essential service designation may strike. 110 Section 
72(3)(b), as it was prior to the 2014 amendments, specifically stipulated that in the 
event of a ratified minimum service level agreement or a minimum service 
determination by the ESC, the right to compulsory arbitration as provided for in 
section 74 did not apply. Uncertainty however existed as to the correct interpretation 
and application of section 72(3)(b), with conflicting views emerging. 
 
According to Pillay, in the event of such a minimum service agreement, the 
entire designated essential service would not be able to invoke the compulsory 
arbitration provision. Workers not included in the minimum service would have to 
strike for those who must provide the minimum service.111 Roskam posited three 
views on this issue. The first was set out by Pillay above. The second, Roskam 
argued, permitted those workers not in the minimum service to retain their right to 
strike, while those in the minimum service retained their right to interest arbitration. 
The third position he advanced, was that all the workers in the designated essential 
service may exercise a right to either invoke strike action or refer a dispute to interest 
arbitration. If the strike option is preferred, then those workers within the minimum 
service would not be allowed to strike.112 This issue had never come before the 
courts by the time the time amendments to section 72 were promulgated in 2014 and 
2018 respectively. 
 
An amendment to section 72 was introduced in 2014 that sought to clarify the 
uncertainty that had emerged in relation to section 72 (3)(b). This clarification was 
intended to promote interest arbitration and not leave workers in a minimum service 
 
109 Section 72(b) of the LRA prior to the 2014 amendments. 
110  Cohen and Le Roux (fn 57) at 116. 
111 Pillay (fn 56) at 25. 
112 Roskam (fn 9) at 23-24. 
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with no means to resolve their dispute. The amendment113 provides that section 74, ie 
the right to refer an interest dispute to compulsory arbitration, would apply to 
employees involved in a designated essential service if a majority of the employees 
engaged in the essential service voted in a ballot in favour of interest arbitration. 
Section 74 would however not apply if the notice of a strike or a lock-out had been 
issued prior to the holding of a ballot. The net effect of these amendments is that, if 
so decided, there would be no strike or lock-out in the essential service concerned 
and that all the workers within the essential service would retain the right to refer 
their dispute to compulsory interest arbitration. 
 
The 2014 amendment, I would suggest, did not have the desired effect of 
enhanced dispute resolution within essential services. A key reason for this was that 
the new section 72(5) only referred to instances where a minimum service had been 
determined by the ESC. No reference was made to ratified minimum service level 
agreements. The clause specifically read as follows: 
 
‘Despite subsections (3) and (4), section 74 applies to a designated essential 
service in respect of which the essential services committee has made a 
determination of minimum services if the majority of employees employed in 
the essential services voted in a ballot in favour of this.’ 
 
The 2014 formulation led to a change in the way in which parties to the SALGBC 
approached the conclusion of minimum service level agreements. I return to this 
issue and to consider more of the 2014 amendments in section 3.6. 
 
A 2018 amendment to section 72 (5) appears to have covered up this 
loophole. The section now provides as follows: 
 
‘Despite subsections (3) and (4), section 74 applies to a designated essential 
service in respect of which the essential services committee has ratified a 
minimum services agreement or has made a determination of minimum 
services if the majority of employees employed in the essential services voted 




113 Sections 72(5) and (6) of the LRA. 
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Here again, as with the 2014 amendment to section 72(5), it is far too soon to be in 
position to determine whether the amendment will have a positive effect on regulating 
essential service disputes within the municipal sector. 
 
3.5 The prevalence of strikes in essential services  
 
Strikes by essential service workers in South Africa such as medical staff, municipal 
workers, and workers engaged in electricity distribution and generation are a 
common occurrence. Between 2007 to 2013, 28 245 974 working days were lost due 
to strikes in the broadly defined public sector. In 2015 and 2016, members of the 
National Education Health and Allied Workers (NEHAWU), the South African 
Municipal and Allied Workers Union (SAMWU) and the Independent Municipal and 
Allied Trade Union (IMATU) were involved in strikes totalling 205 488 and 156 480 
work days respectively. Unfortunately, no empirical data is however available on 
how many workers engaged in essential services were involved, but anecdotally it 
does appear that many essential service workers were involved in these strikes114. 
Strikes in the public sector are also often characterised by violence.115  
 
In response to the violence in strikes involving essential service workers, it 
has been argued that strikes could be completely prohibited in essential services 
without undermining the collective bargaining rights of workers.  Brand has 
suggested that ‘by eliminating the right to strike in essential services (i.e. not only in 
minimum services) and requiring all disputes to be referred to arbitration, it would be 
possible to create a collective bargaining structure with appropriate bargaining units 
for essential service workers by means of interest arbitration. This would have to be 
accompanied by ‘an overriding duty to bargain provided for by the law in the broader 
public sector’.116 However, Du Toit and Ronnie are not convinced that ‘a move away 
 
114 D duToit et al Revisiting strikes in essential services (2018)39 ILJ 2131 at 2142. 
115 R le Roux and T Cohen (fn 24) at 3. 
116 J Brand ‘Strikes in essential services.’  Seminar paper delivered to SASLAW 22 September 
2010 available at http://accountabilitynow.org.za/strikes-essential-services/ (Accessed on 12 
December 2017) at section on Structural Problems. 
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from the minimum services approach to a total ban on strikes by essential service 
workers would pass constitutional muster.’117 
 
According to a 2013 Public Sector Co-ordinating Bargaining Council report 
strikes in services such as health services, police services, municipal services and 
court services have not resulted in any reported loss of life.118 Communities have 
been inconvenienced and ‘business devastated by frequent and prolonged 
interruptions in services like electricity and water.’119 This situation changed 
dramatically in 2018 with the strike by health care workers in the North West 
province. According to reports, at least 64 people are alleged to have died as a result 
of the strike. Thousands more patients, it is claimed, were seriously compromised 
due to being denied access to chronic treatment and medication.120 
 
Pillay claims that essential services can be minimised without any 
endangerment to the life and safety of the whole or part of the population. In many 
instances, services are interrupted because the state has failed to provide them.121  
Essential services are also interrupted when authorities resort to the suspension of 
services as part of their credit control mechanisms. Electricity and water cut-offs are 
a regular feature of the lives of millions of South Africans.122 This brings into 
question the constitutional obligations of the authorities to maintain minimum levels 
of basic services. 
 
3.6 The 2014 amendments to the LRA 
 
The increasing number of strikes in essential services led, in 2014, to the first major 
amendments to sections 70 to 74 of the LRA. These amendments were aimed at 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the procedures for designating essential 
 
117 D du Toit and R Ronnie ‘The necessary evolution of strike law’ in R Le Roux and A Rycroft 
(eds) Reinventing labour law: Reflecting on the first 15 years of the Labour Relations Act and 
future challenges (2012) at 211. 
118 Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council Draft Report – Minimum Services November 
(2013) at 28.  
119 Ibid. 
120 See https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-05-20-health-e-news-how-to-stop-
strikes-from-killing-patients/  (accessed on 20 November 2018) 
121 Pillay (fn 77) at 813. 
122 D McDonald and J Pape ‘Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery’ (2002)  at 162 
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services and the conclusion of minimum service arrangements. The amendments 
reflected many of the recommendations contained in two reports by Roskam.123 
Roskam’s initial report concluded that the regulatory system, as it stood at the time, 
was dysfunctional in that ‘on the one hand it does not discourage strikes taking place 
in essential services and, on the other hand, employees in these services do not have 
confidence in other ways of remedying their disputes and grievances.’124 
 
The Roskam reports were compiled following desktop studies of national and 
international systems as well as interviews with key persons in the labour relations 
arena. These included representatives from the CCMA, the Department of Labour 
and, members of the ESC. The ESC interviewees included those members who had 
been nominated by organised business and labour. 
 
In introducing these amendments, government, concurring with much of what 
was in the Roskam reports, noted that numerous problems had been identified under 
the arrangement as it stood at the time. These included the broad scope of the 
existing essential service designations and the small number of MSAs that had been 
ratified by the ESC.125 
 
As a further means to ensure that minimum service levels are in place in 
designated essential services, an amendment was introduced permitting the ESC to 
direct parties to conclude a minimum service agreement within a specified period. 
Failure to conclude an agreement would allow the ESC to determine the minimum 
service that would be required in the event of a strike. Roskam, with reference to the 
Canadian determination system, warns of the problem with such determination of 
minimum services. Determinations by a third party often tend to err on the side of 
caution by including high numbers of employees to constitute the minimum service. 
This has the potential of rendering a strike ineffective.126 The ILO itself has warned 
 
123 See Roskam (fn 9) and A Roskam and N Howard A new model for the regulation of essential 
services (2011). 
124 Roskam and Howard (fn 123) at 5 
125 RSA ‘Memorandum of Objects Labour Relations Amendment Bill’ (2012) at 6. 
126 Roskam (fn 9) at 69. 
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of this practice in that it ‘restricts one of the essential means of pressure available to 
workers to defend their economic and social interests.’127 
 
A further amendment aimed at bolstering the capacity of the ESC is to be 
found in section 70E. This provision compels the Director of the CCMA to allocate 
‘adequate resources’ to allow the ESC to carry out its functions. The Director may 
also appoint additional staff to support the work of the ESC. 
 
3.7 A review of the ESC after the 2014 amendments 
 
The ESC, first appointed in 1996, was reconstituted in April 2015 shortly after the 
2014 amendments took effect.128 In the period between 2015 and 2018, the ESC met 
on 17 occasions. A focus of the work of the ESC in the period immediately after the 
promulgation of the amendments was to reach out to employer and employee parties 
in order to create an awareness of the new amendments. This initiative reached 503 
stakeholder representatives, at an average of 45 persons per session.129 
 
This has consequently seen an increase in the number of section 71, 72 and 
73 proceedings before the ESC. Section 71 sets out the procedure to be adopted by 
the ESC in deciding whether a service or a part of a service is an essential service. 
Any investigation carried out by the ESC in this regard can be self-initiated or ‘at the 
reasonable request of an interested party’.130 Section 72 covers the determination of 
minimum services, with section 73 providing for the referral of disputes in respect of 
essential and minimum services. In the 2015/2016 financial year, no section 71 
investigations were undertaken and a limited number of section 72 and 73 
proceedings came before the ESC.131  The focus during this period was on advocacy, 
outreach and interventions aimed at facilitating minimum service agreements. In the 
2016/2017 annual year the numbers increased quite significantly in respect of section 
 
127 ILO (fn 22) at para 161. 
128 CCMA Annual Report 2016/17. 
129 CCMA Annual Report 2015/2016 at 71. 
130 Section 70B(1)(d) of the LRA. 
131 CCMA Annual Report 2015/2016 at 73 and 74. 
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71, 72 and 73 matters.132 This momentum has not been maintained in the 2017/2018 
financial year. 
 
Table 1: Section 71, 72 and 73 matters dealt with by the ESC 
 
 2015/2016 2016/2017 2017/2018 
Section 71 0 11 11 
Section 72 20 121 7 
Section 73 7 10 7 
Source: CCMA Annual Reports 
 
While there has been an increase in the activity of the ESC since the 
introduction of the 2014 amendments, a complete review of all existing 
determinations, with the possible narrowing down of these determinations in order to 
facilitate the conclusion of minimum service agreements, remains a challenge. This, I 
suggest, impacts on the extent to which minimum service agreements can be 
concluded at municipal level given the initial designations focused mainly on sectors 
and sub-sectors where essential services were to be found rather than the essential 
service itself. 
 
The interventions made by the ESC to facilitate minimum services 
agreements in the municipal sector have led to an increase in the number of 
agreements and minimum service determinations although many municipalities 
remain unregulated. There are 278 municipalities in South Africa.133 Targets set by 
the ESC for the sector in 2018 were the conclusion of 60 minimum service 
agreements.134 
 
 Recent figures provided by the ESC indicate that as at 27 November 2018, 14 
MSAs had been ratified and a further 34 MSDs handed down. I will return to the 
reason for the growth in the number of MSDs in chapter five. 
 
132 CCMA Annual Report 2016/2017 at 65 and 57. 
133  South African Government at https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-
system/local-government accessed on 10 November 2018. 





3.8 The service or number approach to determining minimum services 
 
The approach adopted by the ESC for determining minimum services is currently 
based on the minimum number of employees required to deliver an essential service 
rather than a focus on a specific operation within a designated essential service.135 
The request for ratification of a minimum service agreement, as prescribed by the 
ESC in LRA form 4.8, appears to favour the latter approach. The referral form 
requires the parties to provide: 
 
a) The details of the designated essential service as recorded in the relevant 
government gazette; 
b) The number of workers who  many who fall within the designated essential 
service; 
c) The number of workers who fall within the proposed minimum service; 
d)  A description of the work performed by employees who fall within the 
minimum service; 
e) The description of the work performed by employees within the essential 
service but who do not fall within the proposed minimum service; and 
f) A motivation in support of the ratification of the proposed minimum service 
agreement.  
 
So, while the ESC currently adopts a very broad approach when issuing 
determinations, parties negotiating a MSA must focus on discrete operations within 
the designated essential service. The task of the negotiating parties would be eased if 
the initial determinations focused more on the actual essential service, rather than a 
sector or sub-sector where essential services are located.  
 








There appears to be a misconception amongst employer and employee parties that 
negotiating MSAs are the same as negotiating ordinary collective agreements over 
terms and conditions of employment. Pillay identifies six differences between 
negotiating minimum service agreements and agreements in respect of matters of 
mutual interest. 136 
a) MSAs require ratification by an independent body, the ESC;  
b) The ratification process is not simply a matter of certification but the driver of 
what is contained in the MSA;  
c) MSA negotiations are proscribed by the definition of the essential service;  
d) Interruption and endangerment are two factors central to MSA negotiations;  
e) Industrial action is not anticipated in the event of a deadlock in MSA 
negotiations; and 
f) Negotiations in respect of terms and conditions are voluntary in respect of what 
items are to be negotiated whereas MSA negotiations allow no such voluntarism. 
 
3.10 Factors that inform bargaining on minimum services 
 
Agreement on what constitutes a minimum service is based on fact.  ‘Service’ must 
be considered at two levels, both or in the alternative. First, at a broader service level 
e.g. hospitals and police services, and second, at a discrete component of the service 
e.g. cleaning and administration. These latter services can all be found within a 
broader service. This fact-finding, states Pillay, is all about observing and recording 
how services are delivered in order that enough detail and data can inform the 
negotiations. It is tedious and tiring work of a multi-disciplinary nature.137 
 
Some designated essential services can be cut back by a 100%, while others 
may not be able to cut back for any length of time. The emphasis is on ‘service’ in 
the first instance, and not on people or workers, entities or businesses. Once it has 
been determined that the service can be minimised, the enquiry then moves on to 
who and the number of people that would be required.138 
 
136 Pillay (fn 77) at 811 – 812. 
137 Ibid at 809. 




 Balancing the ‘no work, no pay’ rule for those who strike against those who 
must work and get paid is another issue that can be dealt with in a MSA. The rule 
applies in respect of those essential service workers who are not bound by the 
minimum service agreement and are free to engage in strike action. Options such as 
rotation or contribution of a portion of wages earned during a strike to a strike 
support fund could be considered and written into a MSA.139 
 
 Some further issues that need to be considered when negotiating a minimum 
service agreement are: 140 
• Is the whole or part of the service essential? 
• For how long can the service be safely interrupted without endangering life, 
health and personal safety? 
• Is there a role for non-striking members or members of other trade unions in 
determining the minimum service at any point? 
 
 Pillay asserts that ‘facts’ drive bargaining about MSAs. This, she states, 
makes MSA negotiations more exacting than negotiations over other terms and 
conditions of employment.141 In addition, parties must put public interest above 
‘partisan and sectarian’ interests. The latter are normally what drives negotiations on 
other terms and conditions of employment.142 It is very clear from the discussion, 
that an MSA is distinct from an ordinary collective agreement regarding terms and 
conditions of employment. 
 
3.11 The slow progress in concluding and ratifying MSAs 
 
Brand puts forward two primary reasons why progress has been very slow in 
concluding and ratifying minimum service agreements. First, the trade unions do not 
appear too keen to endorse limited strike action that has the effect of dividing the 
workforce between those who may strike and those who must continue to work in 
 
139Ibid at 817. 
140 Ibid at 817. 
141 Ibid at 812. 
142 Ibid at 812. 
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terms of a minimum service agreement. Second, employers have no incentive to 
conclude a minimum service agreement as all workers, within a designated essential 
service, are prevented, by law, from striking. It is in the employers’ interest to 
maintain all employees in the designated essential service as a means of limiting the 
impact of any strike action. At the time of writing, more than 14 years after the LRA 
had come into effect, Brand noted that no minimum service agreements had been 
ratified by the ESC. A further complexity is that essential and non-essential workers 
are often located within the same bargaining unit and identifying those who would 
constitute a minimum service is an onerous task.143  
 
This has not prevented trade unions from embarking on strike action across 
the whole bargaining unit conscious of the fact that the strike involves workers in 
essential services.144 In certain cases, these strikes were even preceded by the issuing 
of a strike notice. Whilst this may have been the case, such action would in any event 
render the strike unprocedural and stand to be interdicted even before it begins, as 
the strike notice would not have specifically excluded essential service workers.145 
 
Roskam has suggested that it might be more useful for NEDLAC to develop 
a Code of Good Practice, as provided for in section 203 of the LRA, to guide the 
conclusion of minimum service level negotiations. Importantly, this code should 
include that: 
 
‘the parties negotiating or body determining the minimum service should 
acquaint themselves thoroughly (own emphasis) with knowledge about the 
structure and functioning of the enterprises and the establishments concerned 
and the real impact of the strike action.’146 
 
Other issues, Roskam suggests, to be included in the code, are:147 
 
 
143 Brand (fn 116) at section on minimum service agreements. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Based on personal experience as the former General Secretary and Collective Bargaining 
Officer of SAMWU. 
146 Roskam (fn 9) at 67. 




a) The parties must specify how the ‘no work, no pay’ rule would operate and 
what would happen to the wages of workers who are required to work during 
the strike;  
b) How the details of the agreement would be conveyed to the affected workers; 
c) Discourage a reliance on percentages to determine the number of workers 
required to maintain a minimum service. Local organograms for ‘each service 
must be studied in detail to determine the exact numbers of employees and 
the employees themselves who are part of the minimum service; and 
d) Negotiations must take place at local level. 
While the situation has improved since the introduction of the 2014 amendments, 
much more still needs to be done to facilitate minimum service agreements, 




Negotiating and concluding minimum service agreements is a complicated and 
onerous task requiring detailed information. A clear gap in the literature exists 
regarding the analysis of the ability and capacity of employer and employee 
representatives to engage on and conclude minimum service agreements. This is 
what my study is seeking to address. In the next chapter I describe the research 




















This chapter describes the methodology and research design employed by this 
study. The use of the case study approach and the data analysis process is explained. 
Finally, I set out the ethical considerations of the study. 
 
4.2 Research Methodology and Design 
 
4.2.1  Research Approach 
 
I sought to answer the research questions through a single-case study. The reason for 
choosing the case study approach was related to the research questions and ‘what’ 
and ‘who’ I wanted to draw certain conclusions from. The unit of analysis in my 
research was a metropolitan municipality.   
  
A case study is ‘an in-depth examination of a single instance of some social 
phenomenon.’ Case studies may be either descriptive or exploratory.148 They are 
useful when the strategy of the research is exploratory rather than to confirm or 
disprove a hypothesis and when internal validity is given preference over external 
validity.149 The city of Ximafana (a pseudonym) is a metropolitan municipality as 
provided for in the Municipal Systems Act No. 44 of 2000. Municipalities are prime 
‘sectors’ where essential services are located.  According to Yin150, case studies can 
be either explanatory, exploratory or descriptive. This study is primarily exploratory 
in nature in that I sought to develop a better understanding of why there were no 
ratified minimum service level agreements in Ximafana. The case study approach 
 
148 E Babbie ‘Social Research Counts’ Int Ed (2013) at 149. 
149 J Gerring ‘What is a case study and what is it good for’ (2004) 98 No.2 American Political 
Science Review 341 
150 R. K. Yin  Case study research: Design and methods (2003)  
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allowed me to develop a holistic sense of what is happening in Ximafana, in a way 
that could elucidate the features of the municipal sector.151  
 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
 
The research took a predominantly qualitative approach utilising semi-structured 
interviews with key participants. The participants were drawn from amongst 
negotiators of the employer and the two trade unions recognised by the Ximafana 
municipality. The two trade unions are the South African Municipal Workers Union 
(SAMWU) and the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) (see 
appendices A and B for the interview schedules for trade union and employer 
participants respectively). 
  
The research also incorporated a desktop study of the literature on collective 
bargaining, the right to strike, dispute resolution and, the regulation of essential 
services in the municipal sector. Additional data were also sourced from the South 
African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) and the Essential Service 
Committee (ESC). I also drew on my own experience from having been employed in 
the municipals sector for more than two decades. 
 
4.2.3 Selection of the sample 
 
The study took a purposive approach to sampling. The selection of the interviewees 
was based on their involvement in essential service and minimum service 
negotiations within the employer. Appendix C is the letter sent to the trade unions 
and the employer requesting their co-operation in identifying persons who met the 
criteria I had chosen.  
 
It was not easy to secure the number of people I had intended to interview. 
Instead of the cohort I wanted to interview, only 14 interviews were held.  This 
decision was based on practical considerations like timing and availability. I decided 
to continue with this number as it was not my intention to use a sufficiently 
 
151 ES Adler and R Clark ‘An invitation to social research’ 5ed (2015) at 172. 
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representative sample to prove a hypothesis but rather to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the situation within the employer in respect of essential and 
minimum services. For this purpose, I considered 14 interviews to be sufficient.152 
 
4.2.4 The profile of the interviewees153 
 
Interviews were conducted with eight representatives from the two trade unions 
recognised by the employer and, six managers from the employer.  Of the eight trade 
union representatives, one was a full-time trade union organiser, five were full-time 
shop stewards154 and two were ordinary shop stewards. The full-time trade organiser 
had worked for the Ximafana municipality for 18 years before taking up employment 
with the trade union. Four of the other trade union representatives had more than 
twenty years work experience in the municipal sector (see appendix D). 
 
Of the employer representatives, two had in excess of twenty years work 
experience in the municipal sector and three had between ten and eighteen years. 
They were all senior managers responsible for human resource and industrial 
relations issues in their relevant sections of the employer (see appendix E). 
 
4.2.5 Data Analysis 
 
All interviews were recorded with the prior consent of the interviewees (see 
annexure F).  The research questions and the interview schedules suggested how the 
content of the interviews could be classified and analysed. I used a thematic 
approach to analyse the data. Eight themes emerged from the interview data. I 
reported the general prevalence and individual responses to reflect the views 
amongst the participants.  
 
 
152 See G Guest, A Bunce and L Johnson How Many Interviews Are Enough? An Experiment with 
Data Saturation and Variability Field Methods (2006) Vol. 18, No. 1, 59–82. The results of a 
study revealed that data saturation point is reached after 12 interviews. 
153 For purposes of maintaining anonymity the employer interviewees are described as E1 to E6. 
The trade union interviewees are described as TU1 to TU8. 
154 A full-time shop steward is a ‘trade union representative’ as defined in the LRA but released 





4.2.5 Role of the researcher 
 
I must declare that I am very familiar with the municipal sector as I had been 
employed at the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) between 1989 
and 2012. Twelve of these years was as the General Secretary of the union. The 
period of my employment from 1992 to 2012, included representing the union at 
wage and conditions of service negotiations in the SALGBC. I was also involved in 
negotiations that led to the first essential services framework agreement at SALGBC 
level. I also represented COSATU at NEDLAC negotiations prior to the 
promulgation of the 2014 LRA amendments. Notwithstanding, I have attempted to 
remain objective in the research design, data collection and analysis processes of this 
study. My understanding of and familiarity with the case within its context and 
specific circumstances did assist in recording and analysing the data that I obtained 
in the study. 
 
4.2.6 Ethics Approval 
 
Ethics approval to conduct the study was formally obtained from the Law Faculty’s 
Research Ethics Committee in accordance with UCT policy. Permission was also 
obtained, after lengthy engagement, from Ximafana to conduct research within the 
organisation. However, organisation approval to conduct research came with certain 
conditions.  
 
Key conditions were a requirement to anonymise the case study details; not 
using the municipality’s name, logo and branding; and obtaining the municipality’s 
permission to publish the research. I considered the latter condition the most 
problematic as it would compromise the objectivity and integrity of the study. 
Further consultation with the municipality culminated in what I considered to be an 
appropriate compromise. The municipality would not interfere with the requirement 
of submission for purposes of examination but that any subsequent intention on my 
part to publish my study in a peer-reviewed journal or as a chapter in a book would 
need to be reviewed by the municipality to ascertain whether the findings and 




  Prior consent was also sought and obtained from all individual participants 
prior to conducting the interviews. Anonymity and confidentiality were ensured (see 




This chapter described the approach and methods used to gather the data in the study. 
In the next chapter, I examine the connection between collective bargaining and the 
right to strike and the regulation of disputes and strikes in essential services within 









This chapter examines the constitutional and legal responsibilities and structure of 
municipalities. I also examine municipalities as employers, and as members of an 
employers’ organisation. The chapter then looks at collective bargaining 
arrangements in the local government sector, and how the parties to the South 
African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) have agreed to facilitate 
and guide the conclusion of minimum service agreements. Finally, I introduce my 
case study and the minimum service level proposals developed by the employer in 
Ximafana. 
 
5.2 The Constitutional and legal responsibilities of a municipality 
 
 
The Constitution of South Africa stipulates that government is constituted as 
national, provincial and local spheres of government. These spheres are ‘distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated.’155Municipalities are in the local sphere of 
government. Three types of municipalities are provided for in the Municipal 
Structures Act.156 These are metropolitan, local and district municipalities referred to 
as category A, B and C municipalities respectively. In terms of sections 2 and 3 of 
the Municipal Structures Act: 
 
An area must have a single category A municipality if that area can 
reasonably be regarded as— 
(a) a conurbation featuring— 
(i) areas of high population density: 
(ii) an intense movement of people. goods. and services: 
(iii) extensive development: and 
(iv]multiple business districts and industrial areas; 
(b) a centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse 
economy: 
 
155 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No 108 of 1996 at section 40. 
156 Act No 117 of 1998. 
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(c) a single area for which integrated development planning is 
desirable: and 
(d) having strong interdependent social and economic linkages 
between its constituent units.’ 
 
Category B and C municipalities do not display any of the characteristics of a 
category A municipality. 
 
It is also prescribed that local government must ensure that services are 
provided to communities in a sustainable manner.157The constitutional prescripts of 
local government in respect of service delivery are regulated primarily in the 
Municipal Systems Act (the Act).158 The Act provides that municipalities must 
ensure that ‘all members of the local community have access to at least the minimum 
level of service.’159 
 
5.3 Municipalities as employers and as members of the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) 
 
The Act does not compel a municipality to be a member of a municipal association 
or employers’ organisation.  It does however place certain responsibilities on a 
Municipal Manager in respect of staff matters.160 The execution of these 
responsibilities, the Act provides, is subject to any applicable labour legislation. 
‘Labour legislation’, as defined in the Act, includes collective agreements in terms of 
the LRA.  
 
The Act does however provide for the recognition of a single organisation, 
having a majority of municipalities as members and established in terms of the 
Organised Local Government Act (OLGA),161to represent local government 
nationally. In 1998, the government recognised SALGA as such an organisation.162 
OLGA also requires that municipalities must comply with any collective agreements 
concluded by organised local government ‘within its mandate on behalf of local 
 
157 Section 152(E) of the Constitution. 
158 Act 32 of 2000. 
159 Section 73 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
160 Section 66 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
161 Act 52 of 1997. 
162GNR 175 30 January 1998:  Recognition of Organised Local Government.  
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government in the bargaining council established for municipalities.’163To this end, 
SALGA, in accordance with clause 3.10 of its constitution, has been registered as an 
employers’ organisation, and is a party to the South African Local Government 
Bargaining Council (SALGBC).164 
 
5.4 The South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) 
 
Unlike in the public service, the LRA does not prescribe the establishment of a 
national bargaining council for the municipal sector. The employer and trade union 
parties have voluntarily established such an institution in accordance with section 27 
of the LRA. 
 
The SALGBC was registered on 1 May 2001 in terms of section 29(15)(a) of 
the LRA.165 The registration followed a period of negotiation amongst the founding 
parties, namely the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), the 
South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and the Independent Municipal 
and Allied Trade Union (IMATU). Many of the smaller regional unions that had 
been part of the National Labour Relations Forum negotiations had merged with 
either IMATU or SAMWU by the time the SALGBC was established.  
 
The parties to the SALGBC concluded several stand-alone collective 
agreements on various matters of mutual interest. These included agreements on an 
agency shop; levels of bargaining; essential services; conditions of service; grievance 
and disciplinary procedures; and organisational rights. These agreements were all 
consolidated in 2005 into the Main Collective Agreement (MCA). The parties to the 
MCA subsequently renegotiated and concluded a new MCA on 9 September 2015. 
 
163 Section 71 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
164 See Constitution of SALGA available at 
https://www.salga.org.za/Documents/About%20Us/Final%20SALGA%20Constitution%20(as
%20Amended%20by%20National%20Conference).pdf.  (accessed on 15 November 2018). 
165 The registration of the SALGBC had been preceded by the establishment of what was known, 
at the time, as the National Labour Relations Forum for Local Government (NLRF) in 1994. The 
NLRF was the outcome of negotiations that consolidated the pre-existing industrial councils and 
local negotiating forums. The negotiating counterparts were nine trade unions and three 
municipal employers’ organisations.165 This was followed by an agreement on 7 September 





There are two other registered national unions currently organising in the 
sector. These are the Democratic Municipal and Allied Workers Union of South 
Africa (DEMAWUSA) and the Municipal and Allied Trade Union of South Africa 
(MATUSA). Both unions are breakaways from SAMWU. It is apparent from 
employee figures for the sector and founding trade union party figures that these two 
unions do not meet the threshold for admission to the SALGBC. Admission to the 
SALGBC is regulated by section 4 of the SALGBC Constitution. This section 
provides that any registered employers’ organisation or trade union may be admitted 
as a party to the SALGBC if they represent at least 15 per cent of the total number of 
employers and employees in the sector respectively.166 
 
5.5 Structure of the SALGBC 
 
The SALGBC comprises a Central Council with 60 seats equally divided between 
the employer and trade union parties. It also has thirteen metropolitan and provincial 
divisions.167 The Constitution allows for an Executive Committee of 10 persons 
divided equally between SALGA and the trade unions. The individual trade union 
representation on the structures of the SALGBC is determined on a proportional 
basis.168 The Executive Committee manages the SALGBC on a day-to-day basis and 
is empowered to take all decisions on behalf of the Central Council unless a decision 
is specifically reserved for the Central Council.  
 
Provision is also made for a Bargaining Committee that may negotiate and 
conclude agreements on matters of mutual interest referred to it by the Executive 
Committee.169  
 
166 This provision does not however prohibit a trade union from seeking organisational rights 
at municipality level in terms of the LRA. 
167 SALGBC Constitution at clauses 5 and 6. Available at https://www.salgbc.org.za/central-
council/salgbc-constitution/ (accessed on 15 November 2018). 
168 Ibid at clause 7. 
169 Ibid at clause 9. 
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According to the SALGBC, there are just in excess of 250 000 employees170 
in local government. The trade union parties to the SALGBC represent 
approximately 94% of these employees. 
 
Fig.4    SALGBC Structure 
 
 The MCA makes provision for what is termed a Local Labour Forum (LLF). 
Each municipality must establish a LLF. The parties to a LLF are the same parties as 
to the SALGBC. The LLF has the power to negotiate and/or consult on any matter of 
mutual interest that does not fall to be dealt with in the Central Council or the 
Bargaining Committee. The MCA specifically makes provision for minimum service 
agreements to be concluded at LLF level.171 
 
5.6 Parties to the SALGBC 
 
5.6.1 South African Local Government Association (SALGA) 
 
SALGA is a national association comprising 257 municipalities out of a total 
of 278 municipalities in the country. 172 According to the Department of Cooperative 
 
170 Written communication from the General Secretary of the SALGBC. 
171 Section 11.8.2.1 of the SALGBC Main Agreement available at 
https://www.salgbc.org.za/collective-agreements/main-collective-agreement/ (accessed on 15 
November 2018). 
172 SALGA Website available at http://www.salga.org.za/About%20Us%20W.html (accessed on 
15 November 2018). There is a discrepancy between the number of municipalities referred to 
on the SALGBC website and the number as reflected on the Government website. 
Central Council





Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) there are 278 municipalities in South 
Africa.173 This is comprised of 8 metropolitan, 44 district municipalities and 226 
local municipalities. Membership of SALGA is voluntary. As mentioned above, 
SALGA is also a registered employers’ organisation and may, as provided for in the 
LRA, enter into binding collective agreements on behalf of its members. Ximafana is 
a member of SALGA. 
 
5.6.2 South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) 
 
SAMWU, an affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), is 
the larger of the two union parties to the SALGBC. It was formed in 1987. 
According to SALGBC records, SAMWU’s membership in the municipal sector 
stood at 142 584174 as at 31 January 2018.  
 
5.6.3 Independent Municipal and Allied Workers Union (IMATU) 
 
IMATU was formed in 1996. IMATU’s membership, as 31 January 2018, stood at 
92 432.175 IMATU is not affiliated to any of the trade union federations in the 
country.   
 
5.7 Essential services in the municipal sector 
 
The initial determinations made by the ESC in 1997176, in respect of the municipal 
sector, were very broad and identified ‘in broad brush strokes’ services within which 
essential services were located. It was intended that parties would unpack these 
designations and reach agreement on minimum services for essential services in the 
strict sense.177 The ESC did not identify ‘part of a sector’ as an essential service as 
provided for in section 70 (2)(a) of the LRA at the time.178  Instead it mainly focused 
on a service as a whole. Cohen and Le Roux are of the view that this approach was 
 
173 See  https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/local-government 
(accessed on 15 November 2018). 
174 Written communication from the General Secretary of the SALGBC, dated 10 August 2018. 
175 Ibid. 
176 See GN R1216 (12 Sept 1997). 
177 Pillay (fn 56) at 36. 
178 Cohen and Le Roux (fn 57) at 120. 
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taken for the sake of ‘expediency and in the mistaken belief that the ambit of these 
designations would be reduced by minimum service agreements.’179 In the event that 
parties could not reach an agreement, the matter would be referred as a dispute.180 
The designated services in the municipal sector are: 
 
a) Municipal traffic services and policing; 
b) Municipal health; 
c) Municipal security; 
d) The supply and distribution of water; 
e) The transmission and distribution of power; 
f) Firefighting; 
g) The maintenance and operation of water-borne sewerage systems, including 
pumping stations and the control of discharge of industrial effluent into the 
system; 
h) The maintenance and operation of sewage purification works; 
i) The collection of refuse of an organic nature; 
j) The collection of infectious refuse from medical and veterinary hospitals and 
practices; 
k) The collection and disposal of refuse at a disposal site; and\ 
l) The collection of refuse left uncollected for 14 days or longer, including 
domestic refuse and refuse on public roads and open spaces. 
The designations in the public service went a bit further to disaggregate 
emergency health, nursing and medical and paramedical services by listing support 
services.  This was however only for the purpose of declaring these support services 
as essential themselves.181 
 
Following an intervention by the ESC, the parties to the SALGBC amended 
their template for recording minimum services. The template now broadly reflects 
what is required in LRA form 4.8.  This has however not resolved the challenges 
confronting the parties in arriving at a minimum service agreement in a municipality. 
 
179 Ibid at 120. 
180 Pillay (fn 77) at 809. 
181 GN R1216 (12 Sept 1997). 
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The geographic scope of a municipality, the number of depots, and the high number 
of job designations are major complicating factors. The unbundling of the non-
essential jobs from the essential jobs is a further challenge. These issues are dealt 
with more fully in the next section. 
 
5.8 SALGBC regulations in respect of essential services and the conclusion 




The issue of essential services was on the agenda of the NLRF and the SALGBC 
since their inception. An agreement regulating essential services within the sector 
was signed in the NLRF in June 1997.182 While the LRA does not specify where 
negotiations in respect of minimum services must be conducted, the MCA 
specifically provides that these will be dealt with in LLFs.  
 
 The regulation of essential services is found at section 12 of the MCA. The 
Council has developed a set of guidelines, inclusive of a proforma framework 
agreement, that form an annexure to the MCA183.  The parties must consider these 
guidelines when concluding MSAs. Clause 12.2.1 of the MCA also specifically 
states that ‘the employers hereby waive and abandon the right to take on 
replacement labour in order to provide a service in addition to the minimum service 
levels agreed in respect of any service determined to be an essential service.’ 
 
5.8.2 The framework agreement 
 
The framework agreement that forms part of the MCA provides that, in the absence 
of an MSA, ‘all employees in the designated essential service are prohibited in law 
from striking or participating in a strike.’ The agreement also directs the employer 
on the steps to be followed when invoking any agreed minimum service. It 
specifically requires that, ‘in the event of a strike, the employer shall in the first 
 
182 SALGBC Fragmentation to unification: The development of collective bargaining in local 
government 1st Ed (2011) at 26. 
183 Annexure 4 to the SALGBC Main Collective Agreement. 
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instance have regard for the number of workers who have declined to participate in 
the strike to determine whether or not the agreed minimum service as set out in the 
agreement has been met.’ If the number of workers who are not participating in the 
strike does not allow the minimum service level to be reached, then the employer 
would be required to inform the unions of the occupations and number of employees 
that are required in order to maintain the agreed minimum service. 
  
 The framework agreement incorporates a set of four forms, all of which the 
negotiating parties would need to complete when concluding the MSA. These forms 
are intended to provide the information necessary to allow the ESC to consider the 
agreement prior to ratification.  
 
Annexure 4.1 of the framework agreement requires the following information: 
Designated essential 
service (as per the 
government gazette) 
Number of employees 
on the staff structure 
(organogram) of the 
employer that perform 
essential services (per 
designated service) 
Post designations of 
the employees that 
perform the essential 
services 
Number of employees 
in the designated 
essential service (per 
post designation) 
 































that have to 
be at work 
as part of the 
minimum 
service in 










in the strike 
 
Annexure 4.3 of the framework requires the following information: 
Designated essential service in 
terms of the government 
gazette 
Post designations/categories of 
employees performing 
essential services 
Motivation: (The parties are 
required to motivate the agreed 
to minimum service, per 
category of employee, to the 
satisfaction of the Essential 
Services Committee.) Parties 
have to clearly demonstrate 
that despite this agreement and 
in the event of a protracted 
strike, there shall be no 
endangerment to the life, 
personal safety or health of any 





 Annexure 4.4 of the framework, under the heading ‘Format for Recording 
Minimum Service Agreements’ simply states that ‘[a]s a result of the amendments to 
the Act, this matter will be dealt with by the Council who will provide guidance to 
the municipalities.’  
 
On 12 November 2015, the executive committee of the SALGBC met to give 
effect to what had been stipulated in Annexure 4.4 of the MCA. A circular was 
subsequently sent to all municipal managers, all human resource directors or 
managers, the chairperson of the LLFs, LLF members, the chairpersons of IMATU 
and SAMWU shop steward committees, regional managers of IMATU, provincial 
secretaries of SAMWU and the program manager of SALGA. The circular contained 
a new framework agreement with relevant annexures and, detailed the steps to be 
‘undertaken to conclude the Minimum Service Collective Agreement.’184 Although 
the old Annexures 4.1- 4.3 remained as is, a seven-step process was now introduced. 
 
 The process required the municipality to prepare a draft MSA, by completing 
the ‘five (5) prescribed forms (annexures 4, 4.1, 4.2,4,3, 4.5).185 Municipalities were 
required to submit the draft MSA to the LLF secretary by 25 November 2015, with 
copies to the local structures of the respective unions. The LLF would then have to 
meet by 30 November 1995 to negotiate and conclude an MSA. The concluded 
agreement must then be forwarded to the relevant regional secretary of the SALGBC 
who would in turn have to forward same to a divisional essential service working 
group (ESWG). The ESWG would then have to check if the agreement complies 
with the requirements of the ESC. A member of the ESC may assist the ESWG in 
this process. Once completed, the MSA would be returned to the LLF for signature 
after which it would be forwarded to the general secretary of the SALGBC. If the 
parties were unable to conclude an MSA, a report would be submitted to the relevant 
SALGBC regional secretary who would set up a facilitation meeting conducted by 
either a SALGBC panellist or a member of the ESC. Facilitations were meant to be 
 
184 SALGBC Circular No.12/2015 dated 13 November 2015 at 
https://www.salgbc.org.za/circulars/#194-2015-1500624847. (accessed on 2 December 
2018). 
185 Only the old annexures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 were attached. The circular did however include a 
copy of CCMA form 4.8. 
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concluded by 14 February 2016 and could involve more than one municipality at a 
time. If the facilitation ended inconclusively, any party would be entitled to submit a 
dispute in terms of section 72(2) and Section 73 for determination by the ESC. 
  
The draft framework agreement was fundamentally different to the one that 
was annexed to the MCA. It listed all the municipal services that had been 
designated as such by the ESC in 1997. It now also specifically provided that: 
 
‘Notwithstanding the above designation, employees engaged in a designated 
essential services and who perform non-essential functions, the interruption 
of which do not directly endanger the life, personal safety or health of the 
whole or any part of the population, such as administrative functions, non-
essential support functions and the like, shall not be deemed as essential in 
terms of this agreement.’186 
 
This inclusion, it is suggested, was to provide greater guidance to the parties when 
identifying designations that could be incorporated into the minimum service. This 
has not been taken up aggressively by the parties. In the interviews, none of the 
participants raised this issue.  
 
 The agreement also provides that section 74 of the LRA would ‘apply to all 
employees who may not participate in strike action in terms of this agreement187 [the 
Minimum Service Collective Agreement], subject to the provisions of section 72(6) 
of the Act.’ It further provides that all parties to the agreement must ensure that ‘all 
affected employees are informed and made aware of the contents of the agreement in 
a manner that is accessible to all occupational levels of employees.’188 
 
 The data emerging from the interviews and information provided by the ESC 
suggest that the SALGBC circular of 13 November 2015, did not have the intended 
effect.  
 
5.8.3 Capacity building  
 
 
186 Clause 3.2 of Annexure 4. 
187 Section 5 of Annexure 4. 
188 Section 9 of Annexure 4. 
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Reference is made in the SALGBC circular of 13 November 2015 about LLF 
training that had been conducted. This training specifically included a section on 
concluding minimum service agreements. This training referred to in the 
circular,189was a follow up to LLF training first held in 2011. Even though the 
training manual included, at section six, a section on essential services, and was 
aimed at building the capacity of LLF representatives to fully understand the concept 
and, to guide parties on how to conclude minimum service agreements, it was not 
one of the ten workshop objectives listed in the manual.190 
 
 The manual set out a series of requirements191that the negotiating parties 
would need to adhere to when concluding an MSA. These included that the use of 
percentages to decide on the number of workers required to work in the event of a 
strike should be avoided. It also required the post designations of employees that 
must be available during off-duty hours to report to work post-haste to perform 
essential services in the event of a strike. A provision would also have to be included 
in the MSA that allows for employees not forming part of the minimum service or 
replacement labour to perform essential services if too many of the workers forming 
part of the minimum service are absent during a strike for whatever reason, including 
sickness. 
 
 This constitutes the only capacity building initiatives undertaken by the 
SALGBC regarding essential services and the conclusion of MSAs. The reach and 
effectiveness of this initiative has not been evaluated. 
 
5.8.4 The shift from MSAs to MSDs and possibly back to MSAs 
 
As mentioned above, parties did not respond to the prompting by the SALGBC to 
conclude MSAs. This compelled the Executive Committee to once again review the 
applicable procedures regulating MSAs. This took place at an Executive Committee 
meeting held on 15 November 2016. After this meeting, a circular was sent on 18 
 
189 SALGBC ‘Local Labour Forum Workshop for Municipalities, SAMWU and IMATU’ (2014) at 
129-160. 
190 Ibid at 10. 
191 Ibid at 138 and 139. 
64 
 
November 2016192 to the same parties that had received circular 12/2015. The 
decisions taken at this meeting, I would suggest, have contributed to the increase in 
the number of referrals to the ESC for determinations of minimum service levels 
rather than the conclusion of MSAs. 
 
 The Executive Committee informed parties that a legal opinion had been 
obtained that stated that once an MSA had been signed and ratified, all workers in 
the essential service, including those in the minimum service, are prohibited from 
having an interest dispute resolved by way of interest arbitration. The parties to the 
Council were however keen to retain these rights on behalf of their member 
constituencies without any limitations. The parties to the Council were of the view 
that a determination of a minimum service as envisaged in section 72 (2) of the LRA 
would be a better option for any of the parties because, as the LRA stood at the time, 
section 72(5) only allowed for interest arbitrations, where the ESC has made a 
minimum service determination, in the event that a majority of employees employed 
in the essential service voted by ballot in favour of following the arbitration route. 
  
It was then suggested, rather confusingly, to the parties that they continue 
with negotiations and, in the event the negotiations are successfully finalized, to refer 
the matter to the ESC, not for ratification but as a dispute requiring the ESC to make 
a determination on the minimum service on the terms provided for in the  
‘agreement’. This would be initiated by submitting a referral to the ESC on LRA 
form 4.2A.193The referral would also be accompanied by existing annexures 4.1, 4.2 
and 4.3. of the SALGBC framework agreement.  
 
 ESC data indicates that more municipalities have followed this route. What is 
unclear however, from both the case study interviews and available ESC data, is 
whether parties had concluded an agreement before the 4.2A referral or whether 
determinations have been requested on the basis that parties are in dispute.  
 
 
192 SALGBC Circular 4/2016 18 November 2018. 
193 LRA form 4.2A is a referral form for a dispute arising from negotiations concerning 
minimum service agreement for determination. 
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The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, gazetted in November 2017, 
proposed further changes to the essential service provisions of the LRA. Specifically, 
it proposed an amendment (underlined) to section 72(5) and a new section 72(9).194 
 
72(5) Despite subsections (3) and (4), section 74 applies to a designated 
essential service in respect of which the essential services committee has 
ratified a minimum services agreement or has made a determination of 
minimum services if the majority of employees employed in the essential 
services voted in a ballot in favour of this. 
 
The inclusion of a new section 72(9), flowing from the proposed change to section 
72(5), was intended to clarify what was meant by the terms ‘ratified minimum 
service” and ‘determined minimum service’ 
 
 (9) For the purposes of this section, a ‘‘ratified minimum service’’ or 
‘‘determined minimum service’’ means the minimum number of employees 
in a designated essential service who may not strike in order to ensure that the 
life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population is not 
endangered. 
 
These amendments were passed by both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces, the latter on 7 August 2018.195 The President has yet 
to assent to these Acts. These amendments would appear to resolve the concerns 
raised by the parties to the SALGBC. Participants from all the parties indicated an 
ignorance of these amendments and were unsure as to whether the formal position of 
their organisation would change as a result of these amendments.  
5.9 The case study - Ximafana Metropolitan Municipality 
 
In this section I set out the details of the metropolitan municipality case study which 






194 Available at http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/legislation/bills/proposed-
amendment-bills/lrabill_nov2017.pdf (accessed on 20 November 2018). 
195 See https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26791/ (accessed on 20 November 2018). 
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5.9.1 A metropolitan municipality 
 
Ximafana is one of 8 metropolitan or category A municipalities declared in terms of 
the Municipal Structures Act by the Minister of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs.  
 
5.9.2 Ximafana in numbers 
 
Ximafana covers an area of 2 461km² and has a population of 4 004 793 and has 
recorded that there are 1 264 849 households within its area of jurisdiction.196 
 
5.9.3 Organisational structure and staffing complement 
 
Ximafana is comprised of nine Directorates. Of these, five cover a total of 15 direct 
service departments and branches that fall within the scope of the designated 
essential services (see appendix H). 
 
As at 27 July 2018, Ximafana employed a total of 26 331 people on a 
permanent basis of which 17 634 are employed in essential services.197 This 
constitutes 70 per cent of the total staff complement. The breakdown of this number 
is as follows: 
 
Table 2.  Number of employees engaged in essential services 
 
Directorate Organisational Unit  Number of 
Employees 
Social Services  Health  1 683 
Informal Settlements, 
Water and waste 
Water and Sanitation  3 735 
 Bulkwater  691 
 Wastewater  344 
 Reticulation  1 503 
 
196 Information obtained from the municipality’s Integrated Development Plan. It was accessed 
on 15 November 2018, but the URL has been omitted to maintain anonymity.  
197 This is according to figures supplied by the employer from its central data bank. 
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 Water Demand 
Management 
 114 
 Engineering and Asset 
Management 
 371 
 Catchment and Stormwater 
Management 
 27 
 Solid Waste Management  3 172 
Safety and Security Metropolitan Police 
Services 
 602 
 Fire Services  1 123 
 Disaster Management Risk 
Centre 
 76 
 Public Emergency 
Communications Centre 
 81 
 Traffic Services  1 134 
 Law Enforcement Services  661 
Energy Electricity Generation and 
Distribution 
 2 317 
 Total  17 634 
Source: Employer 
 
5.9.4 Union membership in Ximafana 
 
SAMWU and IMATU are both recognised for purposes of representation and 
bargaining by the employer. SAMWU and IMATU’s membership, as 25 July 2018, 
stood at 10 838 and 13650 respectively. There were also 2 500 employees who did 
not belong to either union but contributed to the agency shop that is in place within 
the sector.198  
 
5.9.5 Bargaining arrangements  
 
Ximafana falls within the jurisdiction of a Metropolitan Division of the SALGBC. 
The division, in the main, deals with disputes referred to the SALGBC by the 
employer or employee parties from Ximafana. The division has from time to time 
 
198 The small discrepancy between the total number of employees identified by union affiliation 
and the total number of employees stated elsewhere, is as a result of the slightly different dates 
on which these figures were accessed. 
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undertaken negotiations in respect of matters that have been delegated to this 
division by the Central Council of the SALGBC. The division has not intervened in 
the minimum service level negotiations in Ximafana nor has it monitored the 
progress in the municipality for giving effect to the processes that had been agreed in 
the central council from time to time on this matter.199 
 
 Ximafana previously established Local Labour Forums as provided for in the 
SALGBC Main Collective Agreement (MCA). These forums, established on 
directorate lines, did not prove very effective. This included inconclusive 
negotiations regarding essential services.200 
 
 The parties in Ximafana concluded a collective agreement (the agreement) on 
14 December 2014, for the establishment of a Local Labour Forum (LLF) and 
Directorate Labour Forums (DLC) as provided for in Part C, Section 2, Clause 2.8 of 
the MCA. The agreement was initially intended to remain in force for a trial period 
of six months subject to a final decision on the period by the relevant Metropolitan 
Division of the SALGBC. 
 
 The powers and functions of the LLF are as set out in the MCA and are 
intended to deal with city-wide issues and/or directorate issues of a generic or cross-
cutting nature.201 
 
 The DLCs provided for in the agreement are empowered to bargain on 
matters of mutual interest that are specific to departments in a directorate. The DLCs 
would however not be able to deal with matters that had been delegated to the 
Metropolitan Division of the SALGBC or to the LLF in terms of the Levels of 
Bargaining and LLF provisions of the MCA.202 
 
 
199 Interview with Metropolitan Divisional Secretary of the SALGBC on 11 July 2018. 
200 Interview with employer representative, TU6. 
201 Clause 5 of the ‘Collective agreement for the implementation of a local labour forum and 
directorate labour committees.’ 
202 Ibid at clause 6. 
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 While earlier discussions regarding essential services had taken place within 
directorates, the parties agreed that going forward it would be dealt with at the main 
LLF as required by clause 11.8.2.1.4 of the MCA. 
5.10 Ximafana’s minimum service level proposals 
 
I was able to analyse seven minimum service proposals provided by the employer. 
These had been developed by the relevant departments and branches within 
Ximafana. They cover 14 service units with only energy not included in the 
proposals the employer provided.  
 
5.10.1 Traffic Services 
 
The traffic services proposal provides that 676 employees out of 1142 may 
strike. This covers 150 uniformed traffic officials, 47 non-permanent employees and 
479 support/administrative personnel. Its proposal however is confusing in that while 
it allows for the 676 employees to strike, it also states that the total of 1142 must be 
on duty as the minimum service. 
 
5.10.2 Solid Waste 
 
In its motivation, the solid waste department acknowledges that refuse 
collection only becomes essential after 14 days. The motivation however also states 
that as household refuse is now commonly mixed with organic refuse, it points to an 
elevated health risk from the outset. The proposal makes provision that 2 015 
employees out of a total of 2 984, constitutes the minimum service and are precluded 
from striking. This represents a 67.5 per cent ‘no strike’ provision. They also wish to 
have the option of recalling all striking workers linked to the Specialised Equipment 
Unit and the operational employees linked to a specific geographic area in the event 
of an emergency.  
 
5.10.3 Metropolitan Police 
 
Metro Police only provides a schedule of post designations. The motivation 
in respect of maintaining support and administrative staff within the minimum 
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service is ‘to allow sworn officers to perform optimally’ in their function. The 
number of employees in this department that, according to the employer, is required 
to maintain a minimum service is 566 out of a total of 613. 
 
5.10.4 Law Enforcement 
 
Law enforcement provides very limited motivation. Its proposal simply states that 
‘[l]aw enforcement enforce the City’s by laws. They must respond to protest, 
disasters, emergencies, civil unrest and to all major incidents in the City.’ All 1 034 
permanent and non-permanent personnel are included in the proposed minimum 
service. This figure includes 61 support and administrative staff. In other words, 100 
per cent of the workers in this department are precluded from striking. 
 
5.10.5 Health Services 
 
 
Using a template of designations across the service as whole, the health services 
proposal simply reflects employee numbers at each of the 87 health facilities and 
designated all these 1219 employees as essential.  
 
5.10.6 Fire Services 
 
 
The fire services proposal indicates that there is 1 364 permanent and non-permanent 
employees and 120 seasonal employees engaged in the designated essential service. 
The proposal stipulates that all 1 364 permanent and non-permanent employees must 
constitute the minimum service. All seasonal staff plus 37 ‘workers’, 17 
‘support/administration staff’, 7 ‘hydrant staff’ and 7 ‘fire and life safety’ employees 
may join a strike. 
 
5.10.7 Water and sanitation 
 
In respect of water and sanitation, 3 574 employees are engaged in the designated 
essential service. The number of workers required to maintain the minimum service 
is 2 860. This constitutes 80 per cent of the total number of employees in the 




5.10.8 Summary of the proposals 
 
An analysis of the data received for these seven proposals indicate that, according to 
the employer, 10 200 out of 12 726 (80 per cent) employees in the designated 
essential services, would be required to maintain a minimum service in the event of a 
strike.  As a percentage of the total workforce of 26 331, it represents 38.7 per cent. 
 
Table 3. The breakdown of the employer’s proposals 
 


















may not strike. 
Traffic 1 818 1 142 676 62.8 
Solid Waste 2 984 2 015 969 67.5 
Metro Police 613 566 47 92.3 
Law 
Enforcement 
1 034 1 034 0 100.0 
Health 1 219 1 219 0 100.0 
Fire Services 1 484 1 364 120 91.9 
Water and 
Sanitation 
3 574 2 860 714 80.0 
Total 12 726 10 200 2 526 79.8 
Source: Employer 
 
This chapter introduced the case study and the minimum service level proposals 
developed by the employer. The next chapter details the outcomes of interviews with 
the identified participants and present the findings and analysis of the study. The 











In this chapter, I present the findings from the interviews with the identified 
participants and, an analysis of these findings. Extracts from the data are used to 
reflect on the themes that emerged from these interviews. The key purpose of the 
interviews was to examine the familiarity with and understanding of the regulatory 
framework by the identified participants. In this chapter, I also examine what steps 
the employers and the trade union parties have undertaken to build the capacity of 
their representatives to negotiate on minimum service agreements.  
6.2 Findings 
 
6.2.1 Familiarity with the LRA regulatory framework in respect of essential and 
minimum services 
 
Five of the employer representatives expressed a thoroughgoing knowledge and 
familiarity with sections 70 to 74 of the LRA. E5203 was however less familiar with 
these provisions. She had only been employed in the sector for four years. Prior to 
this, she had worked in the private sector. While not completely familiar with LRA 
provisions, E5 did however indicate knowledge of an essential service as defined in 
the LRA and the distinction between an essential service and a minimum service. 
 
The situation amongst the trade representatives was in complete contrast to 
the employer representatives. Although all were familiar with the concept of an 
essential service, only TU3 was conversant with the LRA provisions. TU1 stated that 
‘I know [the LRA framework] but I’m not sure if I’ve got a broad understanding’. 
TU2 postulated a similar view. ‘I’m not going to lie. I only have a very broad 
understanding. I have no knowledge of the LRA provisions and the distinction 
 
203 Employer interviewees are identified as E1 to E 6 and trade union interviewees TU1 to TU8. 
See footnote 152. 
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between minimum services and an essential service.’ TU6 stated that he ‘had not 
studied the LRA provisions on essential services.’ 
 
6.2.2 Familiarity with the provisions of the SALGBC Main Agreement for dealing 
with essential services 
 
As above, all but one of the employer representatives have a good working 
knowledge of the SALGBC MCA provisions regulating essential services. This is 
primarily because they have all been involved in coordinating minimum service level 
proposals from the relevant departments and branches of the employer. E5, while not 
completely familiar with the SALGBC framework, did however indicate that while 
the ‘SALGBC main agreement should guide parties, the template to be followed in 
completing the minimum service agreement, was not very user friendly and too 
generic.’ This observation was confirmed in other interviews with employer 
interviewees when discussing how their departmental proposals were formulated. It 
suggested to me that the SALGBC needed to reconsider the template so that it 
provided more explicit guidance to the parties.  
 
The trade union representatives again displayed only a very broad knowledge 
regarding the SALGBC framework.  One participant said that he was ‘familiar with 
the SALGBC framework but not too clear about the distinction between an essential 
service and a minimum service. I know that we need an MSA. It is compulsory’204 
Another said that she was ‘not familiar with and received no training on the 
SALGBC framework.’205 On the issue of the template, another said he was ‘not 
familiar with working with the SALGBC template.’206 
 
Only TU3 indicated a working knowledge as he had been involved in 
essential service consultations and negotiations previously. ‘I have been involved in 
approximately 10 negotiations sessions over the years. These were cross-cutting 
sessions but dealt mainly with Safety and Security. I think I’m sufficiently equipped 









As with the familiarity of employer and trade union interviewees with the 
LRA framework for regulating essential services, familiarity with the SALGBC 
framework, confirmed the disparity between the trade union and employer 
representatives, with the former ill-equipped for minimum service negotiations. 
 
6.2.3 The process adopted for developing a minimum service proposal in Ximafana 
 
According to E1, the development of the various proposals was coordinated at a 
corporate level. The actual content was, however. decided within the relevant 
departments or branches. One participant indicated that in their department 
workshops were held with line managers to prepare them for this process.208  
 
The proposals would then be signed off by the Director and Support Manager 
of the relevant department or branch. According to E1, ‘they are subject matter 
experts and the best people to deal with determining the minimum service.’ E1 was 
not aware whether these managers receive special training. They were ‘able to 
anticipate whether a threat is imminent in the event of an interruption of the 
service.’209  
 
‘Managers need to be on top of what the law says. This will improve as 
requirements for the job is tightened. Currently there is a bit of a disjuncture 
between operational and human resource issues. The complexity is getting it 
right in terms of numbers required to maintain a minimum service that meets 
the essential service definition.’210 
 
Departments and branches were not instructed to approach the determination 
of a minimum service with pre-determined percentages.211 ‘You cannot have an 
across the board approach as issues like seasonal considerations etc might need to be 









‘Adopting a percentage approach is dangerous. Operations differ in different 
sections.’213 
 
This was confirmed by E2 and E3, who stated that in their sections they had 
adopted a percentages approach but had followed a scientific and thorough process. 
In E2’s department, the latest proposal was very similar to what had been developed 
some years ago, with changes arising from changed circumstances.  
 
The template from the SALGBC was initially followed by all the departments 
and branches of the employer. Two of the employer participants found the template 
to be confusing and not user-friendly. In fact, E2’s department had not used the 
template but worked off the organograms for each depot of the department. They 
listed every post in each depot and considered what the impact would be if that post 
was vacant due to strike action.  
 
The above approach was not followed by the other departments and branches 
represented by E1, E3, E4 and E5. Here they adopted a ‘job title and number 
approach.’  
 
‘We were able to ‘move away from a percentages approach to one that would 
reflect the interests of all parties. We adopted a designation and number 
approach. We had to consider operational and support positions. For 
example, in disposal sites, some clerical posts are needed to keep the service 
running as required. So, it was the nature of the position and the nature of the 
operation that was considered.’214 
 
All the trade union participants were aware that the employer had circulated its 
proposal but, except for TU4, none of them had seen these proposals nor had the 
unions started discussing the proposals. According to TU2, the proposals had not 
been discussed at the level of the shop stewards committee ‘and, even if we have a 






to either their regional or national structures to provide guidance on how to take the 
process further or alternatively how to respond to the employer’s proposals.  
 
TU6 however indicated that he did not support the use of the SALGBC 
template for purposes of developing a minimum service. His opinion was that the 
departmental organograms were the most appropriate means by which to develop 
these proposals. This sentiment was identical to the approach already followed by 
E2’s department. TU4, TU7 and TU8, all from the same union, indicated a 
willingness to participate in negotiations but stressed that their formal union position 
was not to conclude any agreement but rather to allow the ESC to issue a 
determination of a minimum service as the union did not want to forgo the right to 
refer a dispute to interest arbitration. This is consistent with the circular issued by the 
SALGBC in November 2016 following the SALGBC Executive Committee meeting 
where this matter was discussed. The other trade union participants also indicated a 
willingness to enter negotiations. They were however keen that the parties should 
conclude the agreement for ratification by the ESC as originally intended and did not 
support the stance of the other union on this matter.  
 
According to TU3: 
 
‘The union will need to fast track its proposals. If not, the ESC will determine 
the minimum services. We should just crunch the numbers and get the most 
workers free to strike.’ 
 
6.2.4 Training and capacity building in Ximafana 
 
None of the employer representatives has attended any essential services specific 
training or capacity building programmes. Two of them however indicated that their 
department had convened workshops for line managers.215 
 
Other than TU3, none of the trade union representatives had undergone any 
essential services specific training and capacity building programmes at either the 
 
215 E3 and E4. 
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trade union, employer or SALGBC level. TU3 said that ‘the union provided a lot of 
training in those years. I received some training at provincial level, under previous 
leadership, on essential services.’216Another participant said that he ‘did not go for 
formal training to understand all these things. I teach myself. I carry the SALGBC 
Main Agreement in my bag.’217 
 
On this issue, the interviews clearly reveal an absence of capacity building 
interventions for workers and their representatives or for the employer 
representatives.  
 
6.2.5 Managing the no-work, no-pay principle 
 
A trade union representative raised the problem of deciding how to deal with the 
remuneration of striking and non-striking employees in a designated essential 
service.218 ‘This causes divisions amongst workers.’219 This has never been discussed 
by the Ximafana parties, either independently or at LLF level. 
 
6.2.6 Municipal law enforcement services 
 
Another issue that emerged from the interviews is that Law Enforcement and 
Disaster Management workers in Ximafana wanted to be declared as essential 
service workers even though they are not explicitly designated as such220.  The 
employer supported this position.  
 
Law Enforcement had historically been accepted by the parties as constituting 
an essential service. This was due to law enforcement, in an earlier iteration of the 
Safety and Security department of Ximafana, falling within what was clustered as 
‘Traffic and Law Enforcement Services’. Law Enforcement was mainly responsible 
for enforcing municipal by-laws. Subsequent restructuring had separated law 




218 TU 3 and TU4. 




proclamation had now been issued that extended the powers of law enforcement 
officers to much of what was currently undertaken by traffic officers and 
metropolitan police services.221 It had been suggested that, in order to clear up this 
confusion, it might be sound for the ESC to now define what is meant by ‘municipal 
policing’222 
 
6.2.7 Why have the parties in Ximafana not used the dispute resolution provisions 
of the LRA 
 
In a general sense, all the employer participants stated that the employer was not in 
any rush to arrive at minimum service levels. The prevailing ‘all-in’ cover provided 
by the existing ESC determinations was beneficial for the employer. 223  
 
‘Both sides have an incentive to disregard the law – the ‘all-in cover provided 
by the determinations and the fact that the employer never dismisses.’224 
 
 
An employer participant could not understand why the trade unions have not 
declared a dispute on the absence of agreed minimum service levels.225 The trade 
union representatives provided no clear-cut answers as to why the trade unions in 
Ximafana had not followed the dispute resolution provisions of the LRA to resolve 
the delay in concluding minimum service level agreements.  This approach appeared 
consistent with the general apathy by the trade unions towards a system that served 
to divide the workforce and where, at present, the employer was reluctant to institute 
more decisive action against striking essential service workers.  
 
E1 and E2 also raised a concern about the employer’s failure to use other 
legislative means at their disposal to intervene in the event of strike action by 
essential service workers thereby encouraging employees to ‘act with impunity.’  
 
‘We don’t really dismiss. We give warnings, deduct pay etcetera. Regardless 









agreement. Given what has gone before, there is no guarantee that any 
agreement will be adhered to’226 
 
 
The trade unions have also displayed an aversion to refer disputes on matters 
of mutual interest to compulsory arbitration. This I submit was due to a lack of 
confidence in compulsory interest arbitration process as reflected on in section 3.4.3. 
 
6.2.8 Union legitimacy 
 
Another issue that emerged, unprompted, from amongst the employer representatives 
in the interviews was that of trade union legitimacy.  One employer participant said 
that ‘one union is fighting political battles within the union to decide how to 
approach this issue.’ 227  Another said that ‘unions are failing to advance their 
members interests in ways other than to resort to strikes.’228 
 
‘Union legitimacy is in question and they need to address this. It is ‘becoming 
more difficult to mobilise members to strike – this applies to both unions.’ 
The employer has ‘introduced driver training and other staff development 
interventions that has driven workers and management closer together.229 
 
The issue of union legitimacy and the strategic and tactical choices made to pursue 
member interests, other than a broad statement of intent to maintain unity, is not only 
applicable to the unions in Ximafana. From my own experience, the issue of union 
legitimacy and relevance is a challenge confronting the trade union movement 
internationally and nationally. 
 
6.2.9 Interventions necessary to improve the current situation in Ximafana 
 
The identified interviewees suggested a number of interventions that should be 
considered to improve the current situation in Ximafana. An employer participant 









‘There are too many grey areas – any agreement must be properly informed. 
The ESC should relook at the existing designations. Our own job titles need 
to be reviewed. For example, that of professional officer. We need more 
descriptive job titles. The whole environment around minimum services 
should be as formal and structured as possible, that will help a lot. The 
responsibility rests with both sides to drive the negotiations. Consideration 
should be given to bringing in independent people to chair the 
negotiations.’230 
 
The suggestions put forward by E1, like most of the suggestions that follow, had not 
been proposed by any of the parties and considered at the LLF.  
 
6.2.9.1 Improving familiarity with the regulatory framework 
 
Trade union representatives suggested that the trade union parties needed to 
familiarise themselves with the relevant legislation and that they require more 
training.231The current framework is, in almost every respect, consistent with the 
principles and decisions decided by the ILO. The problem, it would seem, is not with 
the framework itself, but with the familiarity and understanding of the parties with 
the framework, and the buy-in to this framework by the Ximafana negotiating 
counterparts. This is especially so in respect of the trade unions. 
 
6.2.9.2 Problems with the LRA and SALGBC frameworks for regulating 
essential services 
 
The interviewees reported no problems, bar one, with the prevailing regulatory 
regime in South Africa regarding essential services. The one problem related to the 
instrument adopted by the SALGBC for recording the details of a minimum service. 
A proposal to amend the template to reflect departmental depots and posts was 
suggested. 
 




231 E2, E3 and E6. 
81 
 
All the trade union participants called for more training for both shop stewards and 
workers. ‘Even short courses will assist.’232 The training should cover the legislative 
framework and how to determine what constitutes a genuine minimum service.233 
 
’Negotiators need to have technical knowledge of the service they are 
negotiating about. Alternatively, the essential service workers should be 
roped in to advise the negotiators’234 
E5 also emphasised the need for ‘greater education amongst trade union 
representatives.’ 
 
An employer representative suggested that consideration should be given to 
the development of a set of regulations that stipulate the minimum skill 
set/competencies that accompany jobs that affect the health and safety and life of 
citizens. This, it was suggested, would aid the parties in determining appropriate 
minimum service levels.235 
 
6.3 Analysis of the findings 
 
 
6.3.1 Familiarity with the provisions of the regulatory framework for essential 
services as provided for in the LRA, and the SALGBC. 
 
The data indicated that the negotiating counterparts at Ximafana were unevenly 
matched. They demonstrate, particularly within the trade union participants, that 
familiarity with and knowledge of the regulatory frameworks of the LRA and the 
SALGBC is very general. Clearly, in terms of the trade unions, very little training or 
capacity building is happening. A heavy reliance is placed on executive structures to 
provide guidance and leadership. The need for training was expressed by all the trade 
union participants. The employer participants also noted this as a weakness within 
their negotiating counterpart.  
 
232 TU2. 






Employer representatives themselves had undergone limited training. None 
of the participants had participated in the SALGBC initiated training programme for 
LLF members. The opportunity presented by this programme, which dedicated an 
entire section to essential services, is a training opportunity lost. The unevenness 
between the negotiating counterparts allied with the absence of involvement in 
training and capacity building programmes have contributed to the failure of the 
parties to make progress in concluding minimum service agreements. 
 
6.3.2 Training and capacity building 
 
Notwithstanding the training and capacity building deficit, all the participants 
possessed, at the very minimum, a broad understanding of the concept of an essential 
service. The same cannot be said about minimum services. While most of the 
employer and trade union participants had many years of service in the municipal 
sector, most of them had not actually worked in a designated essential service.  
 
Technical knowledge has also been identified as important for deciding on 
appropriate minimum service levels. Many of the negotiators did not bring this 
experience to the table. The direct involvement of workers engaged in the designated 
essential services was almost non-existent.  The employer participants had referred to 
the unsuitability of the SALGBC template for arriving at the appropriate level of a 
minimum service. The process they assert was very complex. The interviews also 
revealed the need of the negotiating parties to display the necessary levels of 
technical skills. Training and capacity building in disciplines such as negotiation 
skills and dispute resolution is insufficient for delivering minimum service level 
agreements.  
 
6.3.3 Developing and responding to minimum service level proposals 
 
The approach that the parties had adopted for developing or responding to minimum 
service level proposals was inconsistent with the approach suggested by 
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Pillay.236While strikes in certain municipal services have often caused 
inconvenience, Pillay asserted that these have not led to any reported loss of lives 
and that these services could be minimised without any endangerment to the personal 
health and safety and lives of a whole or a part of the population.  She has stated that 
the following issues must be factored into a minimum service proposal: 
• whether the whole or part of the designated essential service is indeed essential;  
• the length of time a service can be safely interrupted before the endangerment 
factor kicks in; and 
• what role, if any can non-striking members or members of other trade unions who are 
not on strike play in determining the appropriate minimum service must be factored into 
a proposal.  
This has not been the case in Ximafana. 
 
The approach by the employer in Ximafana towards developing its minimum 
service level proposals is also inconsistent. In services like health, fire services and 
metropolitan police services, in excess of 90 per cent of the workers are precluded 
from striking. Only one department worked off the detailed departmental 
organogram. No compelling motivations were provided for any of the departmental 
proposals. 
 
The union parties in Ximafana, while aware that the employer has circulated 
proposals, have either not seen these proposals or have simply referred the proposals 
onwards to higher structures in the unions. They have not developed any proposals of 
their own. 
 
   The responses of the employer and employee interviewees do however 
confirm Pillay’s views on the complexity of the process of negotiating an MSA. 
 
6.3.4 Party interests in maintaining the status quo 
 
Another reason for the absence of minimum service agreements, the data revealed 
was that both parties have an interest in maintaining the status quo. From an 
 
236 Pillay (fn 62) at 813 to 814. 
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employer perspective, the current ‘all-in’ effect of the current determinations rules 
out the option of strikes in designated essential services. This legally guarantees that 
essential services cannot be disrupted by strike action and, from my own experience, 
the risk of dividing workers along a strike/no strike, pay/no pay basis, is lessened.  
 
Where workers in essential services have gone on strike, the Ximafana has 
shown reluctance to pursue mechanisms provided in law to respond to the strike. 
This includes the dismissal of striking essential service workers. This confirms the 
views articulated by Brand that trade unions embark on strike action involving 
essential service workers with impunity.237 
 
The response by government to the recent strike by health workers in the 
North West province favoured a political solution above remedies allowed in law for 
dealing with strikes by essential service workers. This confirms the approach adopted 
by the employer in Ximafana. In this strike, the majority union NEHAWU absolved 
itself of any responsibility to provide essential services by laying the blame for the 
strike at the door of the employer for failing to respond positively to their substantive 
demands.238The approach of NEHAWU re-affirms Brand and reaffirms the stance 
adopted by the trade unions in Ximafana. 
 
6.3.5 Union legitimacy 
 
The state of trade unions in South Africa has been the subject of commentary 
since the advent of the post-apartheid South Africa. The Marikana massacre in 2012 
served to sharpen this debate. 239 The trade union movement, particularly unions 
affiliated to COSATU and even COSATU itself, have been wracked by internal 
strife, divisions and splits. This coupled with a growing tendency towards 
 
237 Brand (fn 116). 
238 Du Toit et al (fn 114) at 2145 
239 See G Hartford ‘The mining industry strike wave: what are the causes and what are the solutions?’ 
At https://www.groundup.org.za/article/mining-industry-strike-wave-what-are-causes-and-
what-are-solutions/ accessed on 15 December 2018; E Webster and S Buhlungu ‘Between 
Marginalisation & Revitalisation? The State of Trade Unionism in South Africa.’ Review of 




centralisation and, a lack of capacity has raised the question of union legitimacy. My 
personal experiences attest to this. The organisational weaknesses in one union in 
Ximafana, as noted by the employer participants, is a further contributing factor to 
the lack of progress in finalising minimum service level agreements in Ximafana.  
 
6.3.6 The role of the ESC 
 
Engagement with representatives of the ESC and documents reviewed 
illustrate an improvement in the functioning of the ESC. This was also noted by the 
employer participants in Ximafana. The part-time status of the ESC however limits 
the amount of progress it can achieve in settling essential service disputes, 
facilitating minimum service agreements, and reviewing essential service 
determinations.240 
 
6.4  Conclusion 
 
While all the participants acknowledged that the limitation of the right to strike is 
necessary in respect of essential services in the strict sense, only a very small 
percentage of participants were adequately equipped to negotiate minimum service 
level agreements. Neither were they able to, in the event of a strike, compel essential 
service workers to return to work. A further contributing factor is the perceived 
benefit to both parties from maintaining the status quo.  
 
The part-time status of the ESC limited the support and pro-active facilitation 
it can extend to the negotiating parties.  
 
In the next chapter, I present an overview of why there are so few minimum 
service agreements in the municipal sector, along with recommendations that could 
be considered to increase the number of ratified minimum service agreements within 
the sector. Limitations of the current study are also presented along with 












The aim of the study was to develop an understanding of why, so few minimum 
service agreements have been concluded and ratified in the municipal sector. This 
question was examined through a single-case study.  
 
This chapter provides some concluding remarks and suggests what 
interventions could be considered to ensure that a balance between the rights of 
workers and the broader community is achieved. The limitations of the current study 
are discussed and recommendations for future research are noted. 
7.2 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.2.1 The regulatory regime 
 
South African lawmakers have shown themselves responsive to the need, where 
necessary, to introduce amendments in attempts to fine tune the system and promote 
greater levels of buy-in from employer and trade union parties. The impact of the 
2014 amendments has not been fully examined although interim indications are that 
there has been some progress, particularly in the role played by the ESC. The 
proposed amendment to section 72 to incorporate both minimum service agreements 
and minimum service determinations will further address the concern raised by the 
SALGBC parties regarding access to interest arbitration. 
 
The SALGBC Main Agreement provides certainty and guidance to municipal 
role players about their role in determining minimum service levels in the sector. The 
negotiating parties carry the responsibility that their respective constituencies are 
more fully involved in the process. The November 2015 circular issued by the 
SALGBC makes explicit the need for parties to exclude workers who perform non-
essential support functions, within a designated essential service, from an MSA. The 




The SALGBC parties could consider amending the template for recording 
minimum service levels to follow the approach adopted by one department in 
Ximafana. It would also, it is suggested, bring about greater uniformity in how the 
proposals and counter-proposals are developed and presented by the respective 
parties.  
 
Principles and processes for the finalisation of the minimum service 
agreements should be agreed up front. This could include a specifically stated move 
away from a percentages approach to determining a minimum service level as 
anticipated in legislation ie the imminent threat to health, safety and life of the whole 
or part of the population due to the interruption of the service. 
 
Capacity building can be enhanced by making the SALGBC LLF training 
programme compulsory for all minimum service negotiators. This would result in a 
more informed and capacitated cohort of negotiators. 
 
7.2.2 The role of the ESC 
 
A more robust role by the ESC, it is suggested, will drive the parties to negotiate and 
arrive at an agreement or risk the determination of a minimum service being decided 
by a third party. The imposition of a minimum service by a third party, albeit the 
ESC, does however have implications for both the parties in that self-regulation of 
the sector is taken out of their hands. 
 
The part-time status of the ESC also needs to be addressed.  Alternatively, its 
capacity needs to be bolstered through the creation of more panels as provided for in 
the LRA. So, while there has been progress since the promulgation of the 2012 
amendments, more needs to be done. The annual national stakeholder seminar of the 
ESC could be extended to regional level to allow for more essential service workers 
and community representatives to be directly involved. This should allow the ESC to 
play a more proactive role in prompting and facilitating the conclusion of minimum 
service agreements in already designated essential services. A programme for 
reviewing the existing determinations with a view to narrowing the scope of these 
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determinations to align them much more closely with the definition of ‘essential 
service in the strict sense’, could be developed by the ESC in consultation with the 
affected parties.   
 
MSA negotiations are complex.  External expert assistance may be required. I 
propose that the ESC could become this expert body assisting parties to conclude 
minimum service agreements.  
 
7.2.3 The involvement of essential service workers 
 
While both the employer and the trade unions have expressed a desire to more 
directly involve essential service workers in the discussions towards determining 
appropriate minimum service levels, this has not materialised.  Platforms for 
allowing such engagement could be considered by parties to the SALGBC. An LLF 
agreement providing could regulate such engagement.   
 
7.2.4 The provision of essential services to communities 
 
It is not only strikes that constitute a threat to the provision of essential services. 
Government credit control policies along with its inability to ensure that all 
communities have access a basic level of service also contribute to this situation. 241  
Appropriate steps need to be considered for reversing this situation. The more direct 
involvement of the communities in the Integrated Development Plan process, other 
than through simply public hearings, must receive attention. 
 
7.3 Limitations and strengths of this study and suggestions for further 
research 
 
Insights from the Ximafana study should contribute to the stakeholder parties 
identifying strengths and weaknesses within the current arrangements for concluding 
minimum service agreements in this country. A strength of this study is the focus on 
a single industry in answering some of the research questions and allowed for 
municipal sector specific characteristics to emerge. 
 
241 See McDonald and Pape ( fn 122) and Pillay (fn 77) 
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 It was however a single case-study. The study’s intention was exploratory in nature 
and the results cannot be generalised to the municipal sector as whole. The fact that 
the negotiating counterparts in Ximafana were members of national trade unions and 
a national employers’ organisation respectively that fall under the jurisdiction of a 
national bargaining council, mitigates this limitation. A series of case studies within 
the sector would provide a more comprehensive picture. 
 
 The sample size of the study may also appear limiting. While I had intended 
to interview more participants, only 14 interviews were secured. This limitation 
could, it is suggested, be remedied by conducting a larger qualitative study across the 
industry. The issues that emerged in the Ximafana study could also serve as the basis 
for a quantitative approach with a view to generalise the findings. 
 
While mention is made of minimum service agreements at an international 
level, no empirical work has been undertaken on the role and ability of employer and 
trade union parties in this process. This needs to be further researched to better 
understand the South African situation through a comparative perspective. 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
Empirical research examining the issues covered by this study is, to my knowledge, 
absent. This study is meaningful in that it provides insight from the perspective of 
the parties charged with negotiating minimum service agreements. It set out to 
explore why employers and trade unions in the municipal sector in South Africa have 
failed to conclude minimum service agreements as provided for in the LRA.  This 
was done by examining the experiences of the negotiating counterparts within a 
metropolitan municipality. It provided insight into the issues from the perspective of 
both the employer and the trade union parties.  The findings, it is suggested, have 
the potential to resonate across the municipal sector. 
 
A balance between a worker’s right to strike and the right of a citizen to 
essential services, in the strict sense, can be achieved. The legal framework alone 
however cannot guarantee the attainment of a balance between these rights.  
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The actions of the parties and the purpose and the objectives of the law are 
currently at odds with each other. The failure of both employers and trade unions to 
comply with the relevant frameworks remains a worrying feature in the sector.  A 
conscious move away from the adversarial character of industrial relations within the 
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Appendix A  Interview Schedule – Trade Unions 
 
 






2. Employment Details 
 
a. Job Title/Occupation and or what service are employed in? 
 
b. How long have you been in this job? 
 
c. What other vocational training and education programmes have you completed? 
 
3. Trade Union History 
 
a. How long have you been a union member? 
 
b. How long have you been a shop steward? 
 
c. Do you hold an office bearer position in the union? 
 
d. What union training programmes have you participated in? 
 
e. Has the union sent you on any negotiations skills training? 
 
f. Do you represent the union at the Local Labour Forum and/or the SALGBC? 
 
g. How long have you been representing the union on these structures? 
 
 
4. Essential Services 
 
a. Explain what you understand about the LRA definition of what constitutes an 
essential service? 
 
b. Could please explain to me your knowledge of and familiarity with the LRA 
regulatory/legal framework in respect of regulating essential services including 
strikes in essential services? 
 
c. Can you explain the distinction drawn between an essential service and a 




d. Could you also please share your knowledge and understanding of the SALGBC 
Main Agreement provisions on essential services and the SALGBC guidelines 
for concluding minimum service level agreements? 
 
e. Have you attended any SALGBC, trade union or employer training on essential 
services and minimum service level negotiations? If so, could you please provide 
details? 
 
f. How many minimum service negotiation sessions have you participated in? 
 
g. What services did these negotiations cover? 
 
h. Do you think you are sufficiently equipped to be involved in minimum service 
level negotiations and if so, why? 
 
i. When did these negotiations start and when was the last time the parties 
negotiated with each other? 
 
j. Has an agreement been reached? 
 
k. If no agreement has been reached, what do you think is preventing the parties 

























Appendix B   Interview Schedule – Employer 
 






2. Employment Details 
 
a) Job Title/Occupation and/ or what service? 
 
b) How long have you been employed by this municipality? 
 
c) How long have you been in your current job? 
 
d) What vocational training and education programmes have you completed 
from the time you entered the service of the employer? 
 
3. Essential Services 
 
a) Can you please share with me your understanding of the LRA definition of 
what constitutes an essential service? 
 
b) Could please explain to me your knowledge of and familiarity with the LRA 
regulatory/legal framework in respect of regulating essential services 
including strikes in essential services? 
 
c) What distinction does the LRA draw between an essential service and a 
minimum service?  
 
d) Could you share your knowledge and understanding of the SALGBC Main 
Agreement provisions on essential services and the SALGBC guidelines for 





e) Has the employer provided you and other negotiators with any training on 
essential services and minimum service level negotiations? If so, could you 
provide details? 
 
f) What negotiating structures have been set up by the parties to deal with 
minimum service negotiations? 
 
g) Does your employer centrally co-ordinate the minimum service negotiations 
in the different departments/services and, if so, how do they do this?  
 
h) How many minimum service negotiation sessions have you participated in? 
 
i) Which essential services did these negotiations cover? 
 
j) Do you think that you are sufficiently equipped to participate in these 
negotiations? Could you provide reasons for your answer? 
 
k) When did these negotiations take place and when was the last time the parties 
negotiated with each other? 
 
l) Has an agreement ever been reached? 
 
m) If no agreement has been reached, what do you think is preventing the parties 
























Request to interview trade union representatives involved in minimum 
service negotiations 
 
I am conducting research, as part of my M Phil studies, into why little or no 
minimum service agreements have been concluded and ratified in the local 
government sector. I will be using the …………….as a case study. Of particular 
interest to me is to assess the extent to which IMATU, SAMWU and …………….. 
representatives are aware of and familiar with the legislative framework 
regulating strikes in essential services. This includes the provisions in the 
SALGBC Main Agreement, and the guidelines adopted by the SALGBC for 
concluding minimum service agreements. I will also be looking at the challenges 
and obstacles that might have arisen for the parties in preparing for and 
conducting negotiations. 
 
For the purposes of this research, I would like to set up interviews with at least 
7 of your representatives who have been involved in minimum service 
negotiations in …………………. Each interview will take between 45 – 60 minutes. 
Ideally, I would like to conduct these interviews in the month of March 2018. 
 
I would greatly appreciate your assistance in arranging these interviews. Should 












Appendix D  Profile of Trade Union Participants 
 
 Job Designation Years of 




Years and position 
in union  




Health Services Enrolled Nurse 6 years (27 years 
in Province) 
Yes 6 years- 4 years 
shop steward, 4 
years Regional 
Office Bearer (12 
years shop steward 
in NEHAWU) 
TU Organiser Organiser 18 years as 
librarian and 14 
years as union 
organiser 
No 32 years -18 years 
with employer and 
14 in Union; 12 
years as shop 
steward) No office 






24 years No 24 years - 20 years 
as shop steward 
Branch Executive 
Committee 
member, 8 years as 
branch office 
bearer 
Fire Services Assistant 
Emergency Centre 
Officer 
25 years, 15 in 
current position 
Yes 25 years – 12 years 
as shop steward 
but previously 
shop steward in 




Water Process Operator 
– Bulk Water 
21 years, 12 
years in current 
position but 
before that also 
an operator in 
the electricity 
branch. 
Yes 21 years – 9 years 






Housing Inspector 18 years, 8 years 
in current 
position. 
No 18 years, 12 years 
as shop steward, 
former member of 
the NEC. Now a 
FTSS and member 
of the DLC. 
Assets and 
Facilities 
Admin Officer - 
Housing 
38 years. No 38 years, 20 years 
as shop steward. 







Appendix E   Profile of Employer Participants 
 























No Job reports 
directly to ED 





Also serves on 
LLF and had 

































Services – Solid 
Waste 







4 years. Before 






























Do you agree to participate in the research on the terms as set out in the Information 













Date: _________________________   Name: _______________________ 
 
 
















Appendix G   Information Sheet 
 
 
My name is Roger Ronnie. I am conducting research for purposes of my dissertation. The 
dissertation is part of fulfilling the requirements for an M Phil degree at the University of Cape 
Town. The title of my dissertation is “Where are the minimum service agreements? A 
municipal case study.” 
 
The primary focus of my research is to investigate why employers and trade unions in the 
municipal sector have failed to conclude minimum service agreements as provided for in the 
Labour Relations Act (LRA). I have chosen to focus on …………… as the site for exploring 
this issue. I will collect my data by way of structured and semi-structured interviews with key 
participants.  
 
The data that I obtain from the interviews will be analysed to obtain key trends and insights 
related to the negotiation of minimum service agreements. This will serve as a basis to identify 
possible improvements to the theoretical and practical framework regulating essential services 
and minimum service agreements. 
 
Please note that you do not have to participate in the research, i.e. your participation is 
voluntary. So, the choice to participate is yours alone. If you choose not to participate, there 
will be no negative consequence. If you choose to participate, but wish to withdraw at any 
time, you will be free to do so without negative consequence.  
 
However, I would be grateful if you would assist me by allowing me to interview you. The 
research aims to shed light on the reasons for the absence of minimum service agreements in 
the municipal sector. This will be of benefit to all parties in the sector.  
 
I would also ask that the interview be recorded to accurately capture the interview. You may 
decline to agree to have the interview recorded in which case I will rely on my notes. The 
interview will take between 45 - 60 minutes to complete. There will be no payment or direct 
benefit for being interviewed.  
 
Please note that I will not mention the names of any interviewees in my dissertation, make 
their names public or use any other identifiers without their consent. To this end it is confirmed 
that your rights to anonymity will be safely secured. Furthermore, only I will have access to 
the completed interview notes and any recording (with your permission), which will be safely 
secured. I do not believe that participating in the interview will put you at risk of any adverse 
consequences. If you would like further information about this study, you may contact me, 
Roger Ronnie on 0824631464 or RNNROG001@myuct.ac.za 
 
If you have concerns about the research, its risks and benefits or about your rights as a 
research participant in this study, you may contact the Law Faculty Research Ethics 
Committee Administrator, Mrs Lamize Viljoen, at 021 650 3080 or at 
lamize.viljoen@uct.ac.za.  Alternatively, you may write to the Law Faculty Research 
Ethics Committee Administrator, Room 6.28 Kramer Law Building, Law Faculty, UCT, 
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